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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of exogenous shocks such as economic shocks and natural
disasters in producing political unrest in the form of anti-government protests and ethnic riots. It
is integrated by three articles, each covering a different topic. The first article argues that economic
shocks play a crucial role in protest mobilization in rentier states conditional on weaker repressive
capacity or higher taxation. Empirically, it conducts a cross-national study of high-resource
dependent states in the period of 1995-2014. The second article contends that there is a variation
in a degree to which a country’s regions are exposed to economic shocks. A higher regional
exposure to economic shocks is argued to increase the likelihood of regional anti-government
protest at in competitive autocracies. The argument is tested in a subnational analysis of Russia
using original dataset of regional anti-government protest and regional economic data in the period
of 2007-2015. The third article develops a theory of natural disasters and ethnic riots. It argues that
climate-induced meteorological disasters increase chances of ethnic riots because of declined state
capacity that creates uncertainty about enforcement of existing ethnic contracts, and feelings of
uncertainty result in strong group categorization, stereotyping and polarization. The argument is
tested in a subnational study of Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian states in the period of 1951-2015.
The results of the studies in this dissertation offer three key findings: (1) higher resource rents
lower protest likelihood in autocratic rentier states with higher repressive capacity; (2) regional
unemployment is a strong predictor of anti-government protest; (3) natural disasters in the form of
precipitation and temperature anomalies increase chances of ethnic riots. The findings suggest a
conclusion that exogenous shocks are important predictors of anti-government protest and ethnic
riots.
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INTRODUCTION
Popular protests have challenged and toppled regimes, and ethnic riots have killed thousands of
people across the globe in the past decades. The literature has attempted to uncover the causes of
these events and significant advancements were made in examining these phenomena using
various perspectives including the effects of exogenous shocks. Exogenous shocks are particularly
important phenomena to examine for two reasons. First, we live in an increasingly interdependent
world where the domestic economies are closely linked to the global commodity markets,
manufacturing supply, and capital markets. Negative changes in global economy including
economic crisis hit the domestic economies in the form of economic shocks resulting in reduced
output, unemployment, decreased public spending, tax increases, and even austerity measures.
These changes raise grievances and anti-regime sentiment among the citizenry and reduces
repressive capacity of the state. Second, climate change has been a hotly debated topic both in
policymaking and research communities in the past two decades. Exogenous shocks in the form
of meteorological disasters inflict significant damage by disrupting the lives of the affected
populations and decreasing state capacity to provide public goods including law and order, which
may increase chances of communal conflict. Despite important advancements in the literature in
researching the effects of exogenous shocks on protest and conflict, there are several specific issues
that remain overlooked.
First, large body of literature centers on elucidating the effects of economic crisis on regime
change and democratization (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997; Bermeo. 2000; Geddes, 1999; Acemoglu
& Robinson, 2006). This strand of research presents two main mechanisms: state capacity and
economic grievances through which economic crisis is argued to affect democratization processes.
State capacity is enhanced by its ability to raise revenue either through taxation (Collier &
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Hoeffler, 1998) or natural resource revenue extraction (Karl, 1997), and economic crises weaken
state capacity. The exogenous shocks such as global economic crises and commodity price shocks
are argued to result in severe adverse economic downturns leading to drastic fiscal responses by
governments, popular protest, democratization and overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky,
2009). Yet there is a shortage of quantitative cross-national evidence of the effects of exogenous
shocks on protest. The research that explores this relationship in cross-national studies finds that
oil price shocks positively affect the likelihood of social protest in rentier states and that highly
repressive autocratic rentier states experience more protest than other regimes in oil-rich states
(Smith, 2004). The evidence on the relationship between repression and dissent remains mixed.
Lichbach (1987) finds that repression may either deter or encourage opposition activities
depending on the government’s repressive or accommodative tactics. This finding is further
confirmed by Moore (1998). Yet the literature has suggested that repression deters dissent (Snyder
& Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978), while other studies suggested that repression stimulates protest in
democracies while deterring it in illiberal regimes (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, 1993). Therefore,
based on Smith’s (2004) findings, it is not entirely clear whether the effects of economic shocks
are conditional on repression in autocratic rentier states and how that conditionality affects protest
in rentier states with democratic and hybrid regimes. I examine how protest likelihood is affected
by commodity price shocks in high-resource dependent states with different political regimes and
what specific mechanisms may trigger anti-government protest. Further, I argue that exogenous
shocks play a pivotal role in protest mobilization in rentier states conditional on state’s repressive
and fiscal capacities. The type of political regimes of the rentier state determines whether and how
specific mechanisms such as repressive capacity and fiscal capacity that induce protest are
activated. The research question and analysis are important because they help to uncover the
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mechanisms and establish the relevance and importance of the political regime for protest
mobilization. I examine this relationship in a cross-national study of rentier states in the period of
1995-2014.
Second, the existing studies make a broad assumption when exploring the relationship
between economic conditions and protest by implying that economic shocks affect the country and
its population homogeneously, and offering no subnational evidence of the causal relationship
between economic shocks and protest. The empirical studies (Trejo, 2014) and the events such as
the spread of protests from marginal regions of Tunisia, Libya, and Syria to the entire country have
shown that political change often originates at the regional level. This change may have important
implications for democratization and regime stability. Therefore, it is important to analyze whether
and how the exogenous economic shocks increase the likelihood of anti-government protest at the
regional level. I argue that economic shocks do not affect all regions to the same extent, and antigovernment protest activity is likely to vary by region based on the severity of the exposure to the
shock. I analyze the relationship in hybrid regimes using the case of Russia in the period of 20072015.
Finally, the literature has argued that exogenous shocks in the form of natural disasters
produce resource scarcity, agricultural shocks, and migration thereby increasing the risk of civil
conflict. However, the empirical evidence of the effects of natural disasters on conflict remains
mixed and inconclusive. Most studies only distinguish between large-scale interstate or civil war
and low-scale communal conflict. Little attention has been paid to ethnic riots resulting in the
aftermath of natural disasters. Few studies that analyze ethnic conflict find that natural disasters
increase the risk of communal conflict in ethnically marginalized regions (Fjelde & Uexkull,
2012). Why is it important to examine the effects of natural disasters on ethnic riots? The decreased
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state capacity in enforcing law and order as well as ethnic contracts following natural disasters
may create feelings of uncertainty and security dilemma for ethnic groups. The social identity
theories have long argued that uncertainty results in strong group categorization, identification,
and out-group hostility and even make people more likely to join radical groups (Hogg, 2000; Reid
& Hogg, 2005; Hogg, 2013). Therefore, the devastating effects of natural disasters are likely to
increase ethnic tensions and increase the risk of ethnic riots. I test this argument empirically in a
subnational study of Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian states in the period of 1951-2015.
In sum, the dissertation provides important insights into the link between exogenous shocks
and contentious and ethnic politics. The empirical evidence presented in this work contributes to
some of the most disputed topics in the contentious politics and conflict literatures. It sheds light
on the protest dynamics in rentier states under different regimes showing how changes in state
fiscal and repressive capacities affect the likelihood of protest in a cross-national study. The
empirical evidence from this dissertation suggests that the effects of commodity price shocks on
protest play out differently under various regime types suggesting that higher resource rents and
oil exports decrease chances of protest conditional on higher repressive capacity in autocratic and
hybrid regimes while increasing protest likelihood in hybrid regimes conditional on lower taxation.
It also contributes to the debates in the literature on the link between repression and dissent by
showing that higher repression is likely to increase dissident activity in autocratic regimes
supporting the claims that repression is likely to backfire against the regime (Gurr, 1970, Lichbach,
1987, Salehyan & Stewart, 2016). The study of exogenous economic shocks and protest should go
beyond making generalized arguments, and it should to try to identify specific mechanisms
involved in protest mobilization following shocks. Further, it shows that the analysis of shocks
and protest should also go beyond cross-national studies to identify how subnational variation
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contributes to our understanding of protest dynamics. It allows for a more precise identification of
specific economic factors resulting from shock exposure such as unemployment and lower mining
employment that serve as strong predictors of protest. Finally, it shows that ethnic politics
literature should pay more attention to the effects of exogenous shocks such as natural disasters on
ethnic riots. This relationship remains understudied, and this dissertation explores new ways in
which ethnic identities can be activated in the aftermath of natural disasters thereby leading to
ethnic violence. It also contributes to the climate change debates by showing that climate-induced
meteorological disasters are capable of producing devastating effects on inter-ethnic relations by
contributing to communal violence.
The exogenous shocks weather economic or climate-induced are important drivers of
political processes that are likely to have strong implications for both regime durability and
domestic stability. This dissertation seeks to analyze and emphasize their importance in the field
of political science.
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ARTICLE 1: ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST IN
RESOURCE-DEPENDENT STATES
Introduction

Large anti-government protests swept over Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2012 resulting
in regime change in Egypt, insurgencies and civil wars in Syria and Iraq, and civil conflict in
Libya. In December 2011, large protests broke out in Russia following the legislative elections
that were allegedly rigged. More protests took place in 2012 before Vladimir Putin’s inauguration.
Both the Arab Spring and protests in Russia were largest in decades and targeted autocratic
practices of their respective regimes. The protests coincided with the economic crisis that the
Middle East and Russia as resource dependent states experienced as a result of the declining
petroleum prices following the global financial crisis in 2008. Oil prices fell from $140.21 in June
2008 to $33.87 in December of the same year and averaged $60 and $77 in 2009 and 2010
respectively negatively affecting fiscal revenues of resource-exporting states.
The literature has established a correlation between economic conditions and prodemocracy protests (Brancati, 2016). Empirical research has shown that low economic
performance correlates positively with pro-democracy protests and that chances of pro-democracy
protests are much higher in anocracies than in democratic or authoritarian states (Brancati, 2014).
The external shocks such as global economic crises and commodity price shocks are argued to
have the ability to produce severe adverse economic downturns in affected states leading to drastic
fiscal responses by governments, popular protest and overthrow of authoritarian regimes
(Pepinsky, 2009). Yet there is a shortage of quantitative cross-national studies that provide
evidence of this complex relationship as most previous research uses case studies to illustrate the
effects of exogenous shocks. The few studies that do examine this relationship in cross-national
6

studies find that oil price shocks positively affect the likelihood of social protest in rentier states
and highly repressive autocratic rentier states experience more protest than other regimes in oilrich states (Smith, 2004). Yet it is not clear what specific mechanisms affect the protest likelihood
in rentier states with certain types of regimes. In this paper, I address the question of how
commodity price shocks affect protest likelihood under different types of political regimes
conditional on repressive and fiscal capacities of the state. I contend that protest mobilization in
rentier states is contingent upon state repressive and fiscal capacity, however, the political regimes
determine whether and how those mechanisms are activated.
Scholars have long argued that state capacity depends on the characteristics of the leading
sector of the economy through which it is connected to the international economy (Shafer, 1997);
state capacity to defend itself is enhanced through its ability to raise revenue either through taxation
(Collier & Hoeffler, 1998) or natural resource revenue extraction (Karl, 1997). I contend that
commodity price shocks increase the chances of protest because the fiscal capacity of resourcedependent states that generate most of their revenue through export of natural resources are likely
to be low in these periods. Several factors account for the increased probability of protest. The
literature finds that a lack of revenue increases the risk of political violence (Snyder & Bhavnani,
2005). State spending on military decreases and so does its repressive capacity, i.e. ability to
suppress insurgency thereby lowering opportunity costs for protesters and increasing chances of
protest mobilization. I expect the effect to be more pronounced in autocratic and hybrid regimes
that rely on repression to suppress dissent.
Protest may also be a response to economic policy changes that raises grievances among
the populace (Pepinsky, 2009). Fiscal policy changes such as tax and other payment increases
necessitated by lower revenues from traditional sources may take place during the times of
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economic crisis. In case these changes are implemented, they affect individual incomes negatively
thereby raising grievances and chances of protest mobilization. Very few studies so far have
addressed the direct effects of this mechanism on protest and there is a lack of cross-national
evidence for this relationship. Fiscal policy responses to economic crises result in more antigovernment protests that often threaten regime survival (Pepinsky, 2009). States are more likely
to increase taxes during the times of economic downturn (Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004;
Alesina et al. 2008). Tax increases are likely to increase grievances against the government and
chances of protest mobilization. In hybrid regimes, this effect is likely to be more pronounced,
because they have the highest level of protest likelihood compared to autocracies and democracies
as they provide the middle level of political openness and the citizenry has highest incentives to
mobilize for protest to influence decisions (Robertson, 2011).
This paper analyzes how exogenous economic shocks, specifically, commodity price
shocks, affect the likelihood of protests in high resource dependent states with different political
regimes. Specifically, the paper focuses on economic and political constraints in the form of state
repressive capacity and fiscal policy responses to shocks that affect the likelihood of antigovernment protest. I argue that commodity shocks increase chances of anti-government protest
in rentier states conditional on weak fiscal capacities in these states. If a state has less resources to
invest in the military and law enforcement, it weakens its repressive capacity and may increase
chances of protest in hybrid regime states and autocratic states, because these regimes are likely
to rely on repression to suppress opposition and social protest to remain in power. Decreased fiscal
capacity also makes states seek alternative sources of revenues to cover budget deficits and avoid
debt crisis. As a result, resource-dependent democracies and hybrid regimes are likely to
implement fiscal policy responses to the economic crisis by increasing taxes and/or other payments
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to the budget to generate revenue. This, in turn, is likely to increase grievances among the citizenry
thereby raising chances of anti-government protest. Autocratic rentier states, in contrast, are likely
to refrain from raising taxes as taxation is associated with increased demand for political
representation, which autocrats want to avoid to remain in power. Instead, they are more likely to
rely on the savings from stabilization funds, which are created by rentier states to accumulate funds
for macroeconomic stabilization during the times of economic downturn. In sum, I expect
autocratic and hybrid regimes to face higher chances of anti-government protest as a result of
economic shocks conditional to lower repressive capacity of the state. I also expect an increased
likelihood of protest in democracies and hybrid regimes following economic shocks when
conditioned by higher taxation.
I test my arguments in a cross-national analysis of high-resource dependent states in the
period of 1995-2014. The results show that protest in democratic regimes are not significantly
affected by resource/oil rents conditioned by repressive capacity. Autocracies are less prone to
protest when resource rents or net oil exports increase conditioned by higher repressive capacity.
In hybrid regimes, higher oil exports increase protest likelihood conditional on high repressive
capacity. Hybrid regimes are also more likely to experience protest as a result of high resource
rents conditional on low taxation while the same effect is not observed in other types of regimes.
In sum, although the results do not provide empirical evidence for the proposed hypotheses, they
reveal other important observations that suggest that there is a significant variation in the effects
of economic shocks in different regime types when conditioned by repressive capacity and
taxation.
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Literature Review

A large body of literature focuses on explaining the effects of economic crisis on regime change
and democratization (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997; Bermeo. 2000; Geddes, 1999; Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2006). This scholarship presents two main mechanisms: state capacity and economic
grievances to explain the effects of economic crisis on democratization. The first strand of research
attributes the effects on democratic transition to the weakened military capacity of states to repress
protests (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). It is argued that a state’s capacity to repress and defend
itself is negatively affected by economic shocks (Nieman, 2011; Savun & Tirone, 2012). Savun &
Tirone (2012) argue that during the times of global agricultural price shocks, a state is weakened
through decrease in fiscal capacity to finance police and military, which decreases the state’s
ability to defend itself against both external and internal threats. Rentier state literature suggests
that that oil revenues promote regime durability as long as the economic conditions remain
favorable and payments keep flowing to the recipients (Karl, 1997; Beblawi & Luciani, 1987).
Regime remains strong despite social opposition because oil wealth allows for larger military
spending and investment in repressive institutions (Ross, 2001). The literature also finds that oilrich states experience significantly higher levels of social protest during bust periods when oil
prices drop (Smith, 2004). These findings suggest that there may be a positive correlation between
commodity prices and state repressive capacity in bust periods, which increases the likelihood of
protest. Therefore, more empirical research is needed to investigate whether the effects are
homogenous across all types of political regimes with high resource dependence. Also, the
literature implies that the effects of economic shocks are the same in all types of illiberal regimes.
It tends to treat regimes as a dichotomy of democracy and autocracy. This is a major shortcoming
as protesters in competitive authoritarian regimes encounter significantly different constraints and
10

incentives for protest mobilization than protesters in closed autocracies (Robertson, 2011). Protests
in competitive autocracies are highest among all types of regimes (Robertson, 2011), and,
therefore, the effects of commodity shocks on protest may be present in hybrid regimes rather than
closed autocracies. Distinguishing the effects of economic shocks on protests in various political
regimes is, therefore, necessary.
The other strand of research centers on economic grievances. Haggard & Kaufman (1997)
posit that democratization chances are increased by the opportunistic behavior of opposition that
stimulate anti-government protests by linking popular grievances to the autocratic nature of the
regime. Other scholars argue that people blame their economic problems on the nature of the
regime leading to demands for democracy, mass protests, and overthrow of authoritarian regimes
(Pepinsky, 2009; Brancati, 2014; 2016). Brancati (2014) posits that people blame autocratic nature
of their regime for economic downturns, and, therefore, pro-democracy protests are more likely to
happen when economic performance is low. Yet no studies, to my knowledge, examine the effects
of unfavorable fiscal policy responses resulting from commodity shocks on protest. The scholars
have studied how states respond to economic crises (Gourevitch, 1986; Kahler & Lake, 2013).
Gourevitch (1986) argues that states adopt policy packages as a response to crisis by examining
the historical cases of Germany, U.S., Sweden, France, and Great Britain. These policy packages
depending on states’ domestic factors include protectionism, stimulus spending, mercantilism,
support of certain industries, and economic socialization. Kahler and Lake (2013) bring together
various scholars who provide different perspectives in analyzing the political causes and
consequences of the global economic crisis that began in December 2007. The crisis is explored
as the outcomes of political choices made by domestic actors in the past, and, the authors conclude
that there has not been a significant political realignment or policy changes across states since
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2007. Brancati (2014) finds that chances of pro-democracy protests are much higher in anocracies
than in democratic or authoritarian states, However, Brancati’s study focuses specifically on prodemocracy protests rather than anti-government protests in general. Moreover, she does not
examine the effects in high resource dependent states that are most vulnerable to commodity price
shocks. Finally, her study also does not explain what makes pro-democracy protests in anocracies
more likely than in other types of regimes.
Commodity price shocks may result not only in a weakened repressive capacity, but also
unpopular fiscal policy responses such as tax increases in resource-dependent states that derive
their revenues from the export of natural resources. Economic literature posits that commodityexporting countries are vulnerable to price fluctuations of the world commodity prices, which
affect their terms of trade; its vulnerability is determined by the exposure to these price changes,
as reflected by the ratio of the affected commodity exports to GDP; and its ability to manage these
shocks as they happen, i.e. resilience, also affects the degree to which the country is affected by
these price fluctuations (Guillaumont, 1999). Low-income countries are argued to be more
vulnerable to commodity price shocks (Combes & Guillaumont, 2002; Wibbels, 2006; Savun &
Tirone, 2012). However, it is not clear whether resource dependence is implied to be correlated
with low income. What are the fiscal responses to these price shocks? Economic scholarship argues
that most non-G7 industrial countries and most developing countries adopt procyclical fiscal
policy by increasing tax rates during economic recessions (Gavin et al. 1996; Gavin & Perotti,
1997; Talvi & Vegh, 2004; Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004; Alesina et al. 2008). Yet these
studies do not examine the effects of these fiscal policy measures on political outcomes such as
anti-government protest. The unpopular fiscal policies raise economic grievances and are likely to
increase the likelihood of protest mobilization. Groups are more likely to mobilize for both violent
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and non-violent politics if they have economic grievances (Cunningham, 2013). Economic
grievances are linked to perceived economic discrimination, and more aggrieved groups are more
likely to use violent or non-violent strategies to rebel (Cunningham, 2013). Therefore, it is
important to examine the relationship between fiscal policy responses to economic shocks and
anti-government protest.
In sum, political science literature focuses on democratization as an outcome of economic
shocks. The research on the effects of commodity price shocks on protest in states with various
types of political regimes and high resource dependence remains limited. Some studies focus on
explaining pro-democracy protests with economic conditions, and find protest to be more likely in
certain political regimes than others (e.g. Brancati, 2014). Other studies focus on explaining social
protest in states with different levels of oil dependence and find that protest in more likely in highly
repressive autocracies than in other types of regimes (e.g. Smith, 2004). As the evidence for the
link between repression and dissent remains mixed and inconclusive (e.g. Gurr, 1970; Snyder &
Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1978; Lichbach, 1987; Gupta, Singh, and Sprague, 1993; Moore, 1998;
Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; Salehyan & Stewart, 2016), it is not clear why highly repressive oil
regimes would experience higher level of protest. Therefore, there is a need to identify specific
mechanisms that produce protest as a result of economic shocks and see if the effect is conditional
on repressive capacity or fiscal policy responses that trigger protest. This paper analyzes protest in
rentier states as a result of commodity price shocks conditional to weak state capacity and
unpopular anti-crisis fiscal policy measures such as tax increases.
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Theory and Hypotheses

The paper sets forward several theoretical expectations. First, I expect rentier states to experience
higher chances of anti-government protest as a result of commodity price shocks conditional on
lower fiscal capacity. If the rentier states have low fiscal capacity during the times of commodity
price shocks, the chances of protest are likely to increase. Second, I expect commodity price shocks
to increase chances of protest in democracies and competitive autocracies when conditioned by
weakened repressive capacity. Highly authoritarian rentier states are expected not to experience
increased chances of protest because of low political engagement of the population in these states.
Third, in rentier states, I expect protests to be more likely during economic downturns conditional
to tax increases. Tax increases are likely to cause public discontent and spill out in popular protests
against the regime and its fiscal policies. However, tax increases are likely in democracies and
competitive rentier autocracies, as closed rentier autocracies are likely to avoid tax increases to
prevent representation and demands for democracy, which may threaten their regime survival.

Repressive capacity
The first mechanism that I expect to moderate the effect of commodity price shocks on protest is
low repressive capacity. States may experience low repressive capacity for various reasons
including, but not limited to, commodity price shocks. Some scholars have argued that commodity
price shocks reduce revenues of resource-dependent states and as a result overwhelm state capacity
and disrupt its coping mechanisms (Nieman, 2011). An affected state has fewer resources to invest
in army and law enforcement than when the commodity prices are favorable. Decreased revenue
from price shocks puts constraints on repressive capacity of an authoritarian and hybrid regime
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states, specifically, on their police and military spending, thereby decreasing the states’ ability to
suppress protests.
The literature suggests that resource wealth often leads to high levels of military spending,
which enhances a state’s capacity to easily repress any social opposition (e.g. Ross, 2001),
however, reduced revenues limit the ability of the state to invest in repressive instruments. If a
rentier state has low repressive capacity during the times of economic crisis due to the lack of
resources to invest in military or other reasons, we should expect to see higher chances of protest
mobilization.
I expect the reduced repressive capacity to lower the personal risks of state reprisal, and,
therefore, facilitate the process of overcoming the collective action problem when an individual
faces a decision to join a protest. Cascade models of protest suggest that perception of a lower risk
of repression may be formed from the size of the protest or repression history in previous protests
(Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1994). In protests with large number of participants, the risk of being
arrested is significantly reduced than in protests with small number of participants. However, this
effect may vary in rentier states with different political regimes. Rentier state literature finds that
in highly authoritarian rentier states, repression lowers the number of protests (Smith, 2004).
The states with lowered repressive capacity may have fewer law enforcers to deploy to
contain protests. Law enforcers may also sympathize with the protesters and even side with them
if they have similar grievances against the regime resulting from adverse price shocks. This may
depend on many factors including social identity of protesters and security forces, but if law
enforcement shares the same grievance against the government as protesters or has its own
grievances against the government they are likely to have less incentives to suppress protest. Low
repression may send a signal for future protests and encourage higher participation rates among
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the populace. The dampening effect of economic shocks on repressive capacity was evidenced in
2011 when the protests broke out in major Russian cities following legislative elections to the
Russian Duma in December. Russia as a resource-dependent state saw its revenues decline as a
result of sharp decreases in oil prices following the 2008 global financial crisis. The prime-minister
Medvedev announced the reform of the law enforcement system in early 2011 citing economic
crisis as one of the reasons for the reform, as a result of which 280,000 law enforcers (20% of its
staff) would be laid off including the staff and high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (50% of its staff). The law enforcers would be renamed from “militsiya” to “politsiya”,
and the remaining staff would be required to go through attestation procedures to prove their
professional abilities. The reform caused serious grievances among law enforcers, and smallerscale protests that preceded the mass protests as well as the December uprisings and other 2012
protests did not see harsh suppressions of the protests. Instead, the regime responded with some
concessions to protesters’ demands and implemented several legislative changes to the electoral
process.
The effect is likely to be relevant to hybrid regimes and autocracies for two reasons. First,
the underdevelopment of democratic institutional channels such as petitioning the state, pursuing
legal action, voting in free and fair elections, lobbying the government, pursuing accountability of
elected officials and transparency of government actions, and engaging in public discussion makes
people more likely to express their grievances through protests. Second, the ability to repress is
more relevant for autocracies and hybrid regimes that rely on it to suppress protests. Democracies
are argued to provide more channels for groups to pursue their goals, which reduces the likelihood
of violent protest (Cunningham, 2013). Democracies provide highest level of political openness
and representation among all regime types. Because political stability in democracies rarely relies
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on repression, the effect of repressive capacity is less relevant for democracies than other types of
regimes. Protest in democracies is likely to take place regardless of changes in state’s repressive
capacity. The autocratic and hybrid regimes, however, do rely on repression to suppress protest,
and, therefore, protesting may be more costly in these regimes than in democracies. Decreased
repressive capacity means fewer costs for the protesters in these regimes, which is likely to increase
their propensity to protest. If these arguments are correct, we would expect to find evidence for
the following hypotheses:
H1a: Commodity price shocks increase the likelihood of anti-government protests in rentier hybrid
regimes conditional on weaker repression.
H1b: Commodity price shocks increase the likelihood of anti-government protests in rentier
autocratic regimes conditional on weaker repression.

Taxation
Political economy literature has long argued that economic crises result in the shift of policy
preferences and adoption of fiscal and monetary responses to the crisis (Gourevitch, 1986; Kahler
& Lake, 2013). These policies are argued to increase discontent among the citizenry and lead to
the overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky, 2009). Tax increases, specifically, are argued to
increase demands for democracy (Ross, 2004). This would explain why highly authoritarian rentier
states are not likely to increase taxes when affected by commodity prices as taxation would mean
the need to provide representation. Competitive autocracies, in contrast, provide middle level of
political openness and representation, and, therefore, tax increases are more likely in rentier hybrid
regimes than in autocracies. Rentier hybrid regimes already tax their citizens, and, raising taxes
may not result in demands for more representation that may be voiced through protests. Therefore,
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this is not likely to become a constraint in their decision to increase the levels of taxation.
Democracies provide the highest level of political openness and representation and, therefore,
resource-dependent democracies are likely to increase taxes when hit by commodity price shocks.
It should be noted that there are direct and indirect types of taxation that may affect the
economic well-being of the affected individuals. Direct taxes, i.e. income tax, wealth tax etc. paid
by individuals directly to the government as well as indirect taxes levied through the sale of goods
and services may equally cause discontent among citizenry. Although it may be argued that direct
taxes may have a stronger effect on popular discontent, mass protests against fuel tax in France in
December 2018 serve as the evidence that indirect tax increases are very much capable of
producing mass protest and chaos in modern democracies. The foreign labor force legally
employed in the oil and mining industries are also affected by tax increases. However, the core
argument of this paper centers on the moderating effect of higher taxes that affects citizenry in
general and does not target specific industries. Therefore, the assumption built into the argument
is that if tax increases affecting economic well-being of citizenry take place during the times of
economic crisis, commodity price shocks are likely to increase the chances of anti-government
protest.
Economic shocks in the form of commodity price shocks negatively affect state fiscal
capacity of states that rely on revenues from the export of natural resources. There are three
components of vulnerability to price shocks: shocks, exposure, and resilience (Combes &
Guillaumont, 2002). The commodity-exporting country is thus vulnerable to price fluctuations of
the world commodity prices, which affects its terms of trade; its vulnerability is also determined
by the exposure to these price changes, as reflected by the ratio of the affected commodity exports
to GDP; and its ability to manage these shocks as they happen, i.e. resilience, also affects the
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degree to which the country is affected by these price fluctuations (Guillaumont, 1999). States
with a higher exposure, i.e. higher ratio of commodity exports to GDP are more vulnerable to
commodity price shocks.
It is also important to address what type of commodities are expected to affect state
revenues. The literature finds that capital-intensive commodities, i.e. fuel and minerals, affect state
revenues more than individual incomes, whereas labor-intensive commodities such as agricultural
crops are argued to affect individual incomes more than state revenues (Bazzi & Blattman, 2014).
Therefore, the effect of price shocks in capital-intensive commodities on state capacity is expected
to be negative because state revenues decrease.
States with high resource dependence may seek alternative sources of revenue when the
commodity revenues decrease, which may result in tax increases. This leads to my second
expectation, which posits that an effect of a sharp decrease in commodity prices on protest may
vary based on state fiscal capacity depending whether the level of taxation is high or low.
How does the fiscal policy of a country change when negative price shocks hit? I turn to
the economics literature to answer this question. Keynesian model advises a countercyclical fiscal
policy, in which a government would increase spending and lower taxes during adverse economic
periods whereas models following the works of Barro (1979) suggest that the fiscal policy would
be acyclical, i.e. remain unchanged regardless of the business cycle (Talvi & Vegh, 2004).
However, an overwhelming evidence in the economic literature suggests that fiscal policy of the
G-7 countries would be acyclical (Talvi & Vegh, 2004) while most non-G7 industrial countries
and most developing countries have a procyclical fiscal policy (Alesina et al. 2008; Talvi & Vegh,
2004; Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004; Gavin et al. 1996; Gavin & Perotti, 1997). Procyclical
fiscal policy implies that tax rates increase during recessions and decrease during booms while
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spending goes up in booms (Alesina et al. 2008). This fiscal behavior is explained by the larger
fluctuations of tax base in developing countries than G-7 countries and as a result there are political
pressures for larger spending from state enterprises, state governments, and rent-seekers during
booms because these actors want their share of the increased revenues.
An alternative and more conventional explanation holds that governments engage in
procyclical behavior because they cannot borrow funds from the world capital markets as a result
of being cut off from them during the times of economic recession (Riascos and Vegh, 2003;
Galvin & Perotti, 1997). Based on the empirical evidence, it would be reasonable to assume that
affected states may increase taxes when negative price shocks hit. Rentier states are likely to
experience significant shortfalls in revenue in these periods, which they may need to address by
implementing fiscal policy changes such as tax increases.
Rentier state literature argues that most rentier states do not tax their citizens or have low
level of taxation. However, I argue that this depends on the type of political regime. Democracies
and competitive autocracies with high resource dependence may be more likely to increase taxes
than low resource dependent states because the impact of commodity shocks on the latter is
significantly less that on the former. Highly authoritarian rentier states are likely to withhold from
tax increases as it is likely to threaten their regime durability.
The governments of rentier democracies and competitive autocracies are likely to seek
alternative sources of revenue in the form of increases of taxes and other payments to the budget
in order to cover the budget deficit and avoid a debt crisis. The tax and payment increases may
include income taxes that target the large parts of the population or indirect taxes and payments
such as transport taxes that affect only certain parts of the population. In any of those cases, the
increases are likely to raise grievances among the affected citizens and increase chances of anti-
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government protest mobilization. States with low resource dependence, i.e. tax-dependent states,
in contrast, rely on taxation to generate fiscal revenue, and, therefore, do not experience major
changes in fiscal capacity when commodity prices decrease. Based on these arguments, we should
expect to find evidence for the following hypotheses:
H2a: Commodity price shocks increase the likelihood of anti-government protests in rentier
democratic regimes conditional on higher taxation.
H2b: Commodity price shocks increase the likelihood of anti-government protests in rentier hybrid
regimes conditional on higher taxation.

The summary of the hypotheses are presented in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1. Summary of the hypotheses
Low repressive capacity
Autocracy

Higher taxes

H1B
Commodity price shocks => Protest

Hybrid

H1A

H2B

Commodity price shocks => Protest Commodity price shocks => Protest
H2A

Democracy

Commodity price shocks => Protest
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Research Design

To estimate the effects of economic shocks on anti-government protest, I use Poisson regression
with fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country. Using country fixed effects addresses
the problem of potential omitted variable bias by focusing on the within group variation of protest
in states over time rather than the across group variation of protest in different states as this
variation may reflect omitted variable bias. The fixed effects method warrants that all results reflect
temporal covariance, and any time-invariable characteristics of each country are accounted for by
this method. Clustering standard errors by country implies that the protest residual is associated
with specific conditions that exist in the country because the protest data was drawn from a sample
of countries. Clustering treats observations within countries as interdependent.
The choice of using the Poisson regression was made based on the condition of
overdisperion of data. If overdispersion existed, the negative binomial regressions would be used
for estimation, because the negative binomial analysis is normally used to model overdispersed
Poisson count data (Hilbe, 2011). Therefore, negative binomial regressions were run first to
determine whether overdispersion existed. The results showed that the count data is not
overdispersed with α ranging between .78 and .97 in different models, and the confidence intervals
for alpha overlap with one in most models. The null hypothesis is that α is not significantly
different than 1, and not greater than 1.25 for overdispersion (Hilbe, 2011), and with the negative
binomial results the null hypothesis was not rejected. Because the data is not overdispersed,
Poisson regression became the choice for testing the hypotheses.
The count dependent variables also face the problem of proportionality when estimating
the effects of independent variables, and, therefore, require the use of exposure or offset variables.
The exposure variable in Poisson regression is given a coefficient of 1. It is necessary to use an
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exposure variable when comparing counts over different variables with different dimensions. An
exposure variable models the outcome proportional to its dimension. As the protest data includes
the number of protests in states with different dimensions, i.e. population, it is necessary to model
the rate of protest that is proportional to the state’s population. Therefore, population is used as an
exposure variable in all models. Its data come from Ross-Mahdavi Oil and Gas Dataset 19322014).
Testing the effects of commodity price shocks on protest may also be subject to the issue
of endogeneity. Anti-government protests may result in supply disruptions and lead to less
resource export revenues. I run robustness test using oil prices as independent variable and present
the results in Appendix H and Appendix I.
Table 1-2 provides the summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables
used to test the hypotheses.
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Table 1-2. Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs

Protests

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Source

3,163 26.19728 92.61132 0

1657

W-ICEWS (Worldwide
Integrated Crisis Early
Warning System)

Repressive
capacity

3,161 3.249921 1.121223 1

5

Political Terror Scale
(PTS)

Resource
rents/GDP

3,076 8.693653 12.29138 .0003121 89.16611 World Bank

Net oil
exports/GDP

2,708 .0499911 .2575505 5.171873 Ross-Mahdavi Oil and
.4602627
Gas Dataset 1932-2014

Taxes/GDP

2,053 16.69997 9.046731 .3211919 132.5171 World Bank

Stabilization
Fund

3,163 .122036

Democracy

3,111 3.293153 6.463517 -10

GDP per
capita

3,091 9014.087 14513.45 65.01142 102910.4 World Bank

.3273792 0

1

Truman (2009)

10

Polity IV

Dependent variable
The sample includes all sovereign states for which data exist across all variables in the given period
(1995-2014). The dependent variable is the number of anti-government protests in a country-year.
Anti-government protest is defined as an act in which “groups of citizens who do not formally
interact with government officials, but who, under certain conditions…organize on an informal,
issue-specific basis to make demands on public officials through pressure processes” (Schumaker,
1975, p. 490). The data for the dependent variable comes from W-ICEWS (Worldwide Integrated
Crisis Early Warning System)1, which is an event dataset. Its data come from news reports around

1

The data is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews. W-ICEWS v.10 (1995-2015 was used for
this paper.
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the world coded using the BBN ACCENT event coder. BBN ACCENT is an event coder based on
BBN SERIF, “a natural language analysis engine that extracts structured information (e.g. entities,
relationships, and events) from text” (BBN ACCENT Event Coding Evaluation, 2015).

W-

ICEWS uses CAMEO ontology (Conflict and Mediation Event Observations) to code its data.2
The included target sectors are executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the national,
regional, and local governments. Parties and party leaders were not included as parties may not be
represented in the government and may not necessarily have political power, which would not
qualify the protests against them as anti-government protests. I also include data where source
country equals target country to ensure that the data captures only anti-government protests where
protesters targeted their national governments. The data are then grouped by country-year to get a
count of protests in a specific country in a particular year.

Independent Variables
The main independent variable of interest is economic shock resulting from price fluctuations of
resource exports. I employ two separate measures for economic shock. The first measure is total
natural resources rents as % of GDP (Source: World Bank 1970-2015). “Total natural resource
rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest
rents” (World Bank, 2016). The estimates of this variable are calculated as the difference between
the price of a commodity and the average cost of producing it. The estimated average unit costs of

2

CAMEO assigns the code that starts with “14” (ranging from 140 to 1454 to code 26 different types of protest) to
capture protest and demonstrations events. Only 19 out of 26 codes are available for 1995-2014 period in the
dataset. These include protest activities that demand change in institutions, regime, leadership, policy, and rights.
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extraction or harvesting costs are subtracted from the estimated world price of specific
commodities; then multiplied by the physical quantities countries extract or harvest.
The second measure of economic shock is the value of net oil exports as a percentage of
GDP. The data for the value of net oil exports is obtained from the Ross-Mahdavi Oil and Gas
Dataset 1932-2014. The value of net oil exports is calculated by subtracting imports. The data for
GDP (Current US$) come from the World Bank Data, 1960-2016. I convert the value of net oil
exports to 2014 dollars using the 2014 multiplier in the dataset. This measure allows to account
for a commodity price shock as we should see the value of net oil exports as % of GDP decline
when price shocks hit.
These two separate measures allow to isolate the effects of oil rents from the effects of
resource rents in general. Employing these measures helps identify whether the effects of oil rents
on protest dynamics are different from resource rents.
Recall that the hypotheses makes the effect of economic shocks conditional on high
resource dependence. The regressions are run using subsets of data based on high resource
dependence and different regime types. First, the theoretical propositions advanced in the paper
suggest that economic shocks affect protest in states with high resource dependence. Subsetting
data allows to test the effects of economic shocks in different political regimes with high resource
dependence. A state is considered to have high resource dependence if its resource rents are equal
to or more than 12%3 of GDP. The threshold of 12% was determined based on the evaluation of
the summary statistics in the sample data. The examination of the data revealed that countries in
the 75th percentile have resource rents of 12% of GDP, which means that 75% of countries have
resource rents of less than 12% of GDP. Taking the top 25% of countries is a plausible way to

3

11.56 is rounded to 12.
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measure high resource dependence. The median for resource rents is 3% of GDP4 in the data,
which I use as another threshold for high resource dependence for robustness purposes and present
the results in the Appendices. Second, H1A and H1B propose that the effect of economic shocks
on protest is conditioned by repressive capacity of the state. The hypotheses state that shocks are
likely to affect protest in hybrid regimes and autocracies as a result of weakened repressive
capacity. Democracies typically have high level of political openness where citizens have many
ways including protests to voice their grievances and influence policy and repression is rarely
employed. Therefore, the first two hypotheses are tested on two subsets of data: (1) high resource
dependent hybrid regimes/anocracies, and (2) high resource dependent autocracies. I employ
Polity IV classification of regime types to create data subsets.5
Repressive capacity is measured by employing a proxy: Political Terror Scale (PTS) scores.
The PTS measures the levels of political terror and violence on a scale of 1 to 5 (Appendix A).
The scale is ordinal with higher scores representing higher levels of terror. It should be noted that
this scale is not the perfect measure of repressive capacity because it assumes that higher repression
levels equate to higher repressive capacity. This may not always be true, however, in the absence
of a better and more precise measure of repressive capacity I employ PTS as a proxy.
The data are currently available for 210 countries and territories in the period of 1976 2016. The data for the score are coded using the annual country reports of Amnesty International,
U.S. State Department, and Human Rights Watch. Therefore, the dataset contains three scores of
political terror with the data derived from each of these reports. However, the scores based on

4

3.29 is rounded to 3.

5

The "Polity Score" classifies regime type on a 21-pont scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10
(consolidated democracy). The Polity scores are converted into regime categories of "autocracies" (-10 to -6),
"anocracies" (-5 to +5 and three special values: -66, -77 and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).
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Human Rights Watch reports are available for 2013-2016 only. Therefore, I take the average score
of Amnesty International and U.S. State Department reports to ensure objectivity. Taking the
average of these scores is also one of the recommended procedures by the PTS creators.
H2A and H2B make the effect commodity price shocks conditional on tax increases in
democracies and hybrid regimes. Tax revenue as (% of GDP), obtained from World Bank 19722015, is used to create an interaction effect with the independent variables. A lagged net oil exports
(% of GDP) interacted by tax revenue (% of GDP) and lagged resource rents interacted by tax
revenue (% of GDP) directly test H2A and H2B using two different measures of economic shock.
The theoretical reason for lagging these variables is that tax increases take time to implement, and
drop in resource prices in a particular year is not likely to result in an immediate increase of taxes
in the same year.
Finally, I use oil price as an independent variable in robustness models to address a
potential endogeneity problem. The data for annual oil prices (Europe Brent Spot Price FOB) come
from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) for the period of 1995-20146. I use country
fixed effects and cluster standard errors by country. I omit temporal covariance fixed effects,
because global oil prices are the same for all countries within a given year.

Control Variables
Control variables are informed by the literature and include GDP per capita and
stabilization fund. Other important variables associated with protest such as regime type,
repression, and population are already accounted for in the model specifications. Modernization
theories argue that protest is more likely is states with higher level of economic development

6

The data are publicly available at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=rbrte&f=a
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(Inglehart & Welzel, 2009; Lipset, 1959). Democratization literature argues that higher income
leads to the rise of middle class with its demands for democratization (Dahl, 1971; Huntington,
1991). I include GDP per capita to control for the propositions advanced by these theories.
Stabilization funds in commodity-exporting countries are shown to be used for
macroeconomic stabilization as an alternative source of revenue to taxes, natural resources, or
foreign aid to cover budget deficits during the times of economic downturns. The countries with
these funds may use them to avoid tax increases (Jen, 2007). A country accumulates extra
resources that it has during the periods of revenue surplus from commodity exports (when
commodity prices are high) into these funds. Stabilization funds are a type of sovereign wealth
fund. Sovereign wealth funds may differ according to their objectives and sources of funds. The
objectives of a sovereign wealth fund may include maximization of returns, saving for future
generations, macroeconomic stabilization, stimulation of domestic production, or reduction of the
Dutch disease, the problem of natural resource exports strengthening the currency and precipitating
a decline in other export sectors. Some funds may include two or more of these objectives. The
sources of funds may come from natural resources, fiscal surplus, foreign exchange reserves,
employee contributions (pension funds), or government enterprises (Truman, 2009). In some
cases, the funds may be accumulated from two or more sources (Truman, 2009).
The data for this variable are obtained from Truman (2009) that contains the list of fortyfour sovereign wealth funds, their dates of inception, and sources of funds. Thirty-seven of them
have natural resources as their source, and, therefore, they are included in my analysis. The
variable is binary (1) stabilization fund and (0) no stabilization fund. I assign 1 if a country had a
stabilization fund in the particular year, and 0 if it did not.
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Empirical Results

I present the results of the Poisson analysis in Table 1-3. Net oil exports as % of GDP and resource
rents in Models 1 and 2 show the effects of economic shock on protest resulting from any negative
change in these two variables in anocracies with high resource dependence conditional on
repressive capacity. As the results show, positive changes in net oil exports/GDP increase the
likelihood of protests conditional to higher repressive capacity (p<.05). This finding contradicts
H1A, which suggests that negative changes in commodity prices are likely to increase the
probability of protest in hybrid regimes conditional to weaker repressive capacity. The results
suggest that protests are likely to occur in hybrid regimes when oil revenues increase conditional
on higher repression. The results for the individual effect of repression suggest that when the effect
of economic shocks is non-existent, an increase in repression levels raises the probability of protest
in hybrid regimes (p<.05).
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Table 1-3. Predicting Protest with Resource Rents and Oil Exports as % of GDP Conditional to
Repressive Capacity in Rentier Hybrid Regime States, 1995-2014
Variables

Model 1

Resource rents X Repression

-.002

Model 2

(.01)
Resource rents

.013
(.03)

Repressive capacity

.61*

.94**

(.26)

(.22)

Net oil exports as % of GDP X Repressive

-1.810*

capacity

(.86)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

10.596**
(3.84)

Stabilization Fund

-.681

-.192

(.39)

(.43)

-.0001

-.0001

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

343

281

Pseudo R27

0.7537

0.7937

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.

7

Pseudo-R2 cannot be interpreted as R2. Low values of pseudo-R2 may indicate a lack of fit, but the high values do
not indicate goodness of fit (Hilbe, 2001).
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Figure 1-1 based on Model 2 shows the marginal effect of net oil exports of GDP on protest
at different levels of repressive capacity. The effect of net oil exports on the number of protest
events increases as repressive capacity goes up in the interval of 2 and 4, i.e. where confidence

Average Marginal Effects of Net Oil Exports/GDP with 95% CIs
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Figure 1-1. Average Marginal Effects of Repressive Capacity on Protest in Hybrid Regimes

The second hypothesis H1B proposes that commodity price shocks increase the likelihood
of protest in autocratic regimes conditional on weaker repressive capacity. As can be seen in Table
1-4, positive changes in resource rents and net oil exports decrease the likelihood of protest
conditional on higher repressive capacity. This finding does not provide support for H1B showing
that higher resource and oil revenues are likely to decrease the likelihood of protest in autocracies
at higher repressive capacity. The results in Model 2 also reveal that an increase in repressive
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capacity raises the probability of protest in autocratic regimes, which resonates with the results for
hybrid regimes in Table 1-3. However, Model 1 suggests that an increase in repressive capacity
decreases the chances of protest in rentier autocracies. Higher GDP per capita increases protest
likelihood in autocratic states as shown in Models 1 and 2. This is consistent with modernization
and democratization literature that argues that protest is more likely in states with higher economic
development.
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Table 1-4. Predicting Protest with Resource Rents and Net Oil Exports as % of GDP Conditional
to Repressive Capacity in Rentier Autocratic States, 1995-2014
Variables

Model 1

Resource rents X Repression

-.081**

Model 2

(.02)
Resource rents

.236**
(.08)

Repressive capacity

-2.802**

1.28**

(.76)

(.35)

Net oil exports as % of GDP X Repressive

-3.614**

capacity

(.78)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

.494
(3.08)

Stabilization Fund

.47

.157

(1.14)

(.55)

.0002**

.0003**

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

227

207

Pseudo R2

0.7219

0.7510

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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Figure 1-2 based on Model 1 shows the marginal effects of resource rents/GDP on protest in
autocracies. The graph shows that the marginal effect of resource rents on protest decreases as
repressive capacity increases in autocratic regimes.
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Figure 1-2. Average Marginal Effects of Resource Rents/GDP on Protest in Rentier Autocratic
States

Figure 1-3 based on Model 2 shows the marginal effects of net oil exports/GDP on protest
in autocracies. The effect of net oil exports/GDP on protest is higher at lower levels of repression.
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Figure 1-3. Average Marginal Effects of Net Oil Exports/GDP on Protest in Autocracies

Further, I run additional models (Appendix B) to test the effects of commodity price shocks
on protest conditional on repressive capacity in democracies. The results in Model 1 and Model 2
(Appendix B) show no significant effects of the interaction variables on protest. Model 1 shows
that higher repression decreases protest likelihood when the effect of economic shocks is absent.
Model 2 shows that the individual effect of higher net oil exports/GDP on protest is positive
(p<.05).
The models presented in Table 1-5 test the propositions made in H2A, which makes the
positive effect of economic shocks on protest conditional on tax changes in high-resource
dependent states with democratic regimes. The interaction variables in both models are not
statistically significant providing no support for H2A. The independent effect of taxes/GDP is
positive on protest (p<.05) when the economic shocks effects are not present.
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Table 1-5. Predicting Protest with Resource Rents, Net Oil Exports as % of GDP, and Taxes as
% of GDP in Rentier Democratic States, 1995-2014
Variables

Model 1

Resource rents t-1 X Taxes/GDP

-.002

Model 2

(.003)
Resource rents t-1

-.013
(.08)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

t-1

X Taxes/GDP

-1.23
(2.66)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

24.16

t-1

(39.75)
Taxes/GDP

.134*

.083*

(.07)

(.04)

1.60**

1.53**

(.27)

(.38)

-.0001

-.0001

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

71

72

Pseudo R2

0.8017

0.7966

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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The final hypothesis H2B proposes that the likelihood of protest in high resource dependent
hybrid regimes increases as a result of economic shocks conditional to higher taxation. As can be
seen in Table 1-6, higher resource rents raise the chances of protest conditional to lower taxes in
rentier hybrid regimes (p<.01), which is opposite to the expectations in H2B. The interaction of
net oil exports and taxes do not reach statistical significance suggesting the effects of resource
rents and taxes rather than those of oil exports and taxes are predictive of anti-government protest
in rentier anocracies. The individual effect of net oil exports is significant suggesting that higher
net oil exports increase protest likelihood regardless of the presence of economic shocks in rentier
hybrid regimes. This finding is contrary to my theoretical expectations.
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Table 1-6. Predicting Protest with Resource Rents, Net Oil Exports as % of GDP, and Taxes as
% of GDP in Rentier Hybrid Regime States, 1995-2014
Variables

Model 1

Resource rents t-1 X Taxes/GDP

-.003*

Model 2

(.002)
Resource rents t-1

.084*
(.03)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

t-1

X

-.155

Taxes/GDP
Net oil exports as % of GDP

(.08)
5.577**

t-1

(1.70)
Taxes/GDP

.019

-.023

(.06)

(.05)

-1.744**

-1.316*

(.61)

(.54)

-.0001

-.0001

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

161

143

Pseudo R2

0.8071

0.8509

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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Figure 4 based on Model 1 in Table 1-6 shows the marginal effects of lagged resource
rents/GDP on protest likelihood in hybrid regimes. The marginal effect of lagged resource rents
on anti-government protest is higher at lower levels of taxation.
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Figure 1-4. Average Marginal Effects of Resource Rents/GDP on Protest in Rentier Hybrid
Regime States

Next, I run additional models testing the effects commodity price shocks conditional to
higher taxation on protest in autocratic regimes. The models in Appendix C yield no significant
effects for the variables of interest showing that the effects are not predictive of protest in
autocracies. Furthermore, additional robust models were run at lower resource dependence
threshold of 3%. The results are presented in Appendices D, E, F and G. The findings are consistent
for the most part with the results presented in the main models at 12% resource dependence
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threshold. However, the interaction effect between resource rents and taxation is not significant in
robustness models.
Tables 1-7 and 1-8 provide the summary of the empirical results testing the four
hypotheses. As can be seen in Table 1-7 the empirical results do not support the hypotheses H1A
and H1B. Specifically, the empirical evidence suggests that higher resource rents and oil exports
decrease the protest likelihood at higher levels of repressive capacity in autocracies whereas H1B
expects low resource rents and oil exports lead to more protests at lower levels of repressive
capacity. In hybrid regimes, more oil exports are shown to lead to more protests at higher
repressive capacity opposite to H1A that suggests that lower resource revenues should increase
protest likelihood at lower repressive capacity. Similarly, Table 1-8 shows that the empirical
results do not provide support for hypotheses H2A and H2B. The evidence suggests that high
resource rents increase protest likelihood at lower levels of taxation in hybrid regimes. This finding
is opposite to the expectations in H2B that suggests the positive effect of lower resource rents on
protest at higher levels of taxation in hybrid regimes.
Table 1-7. Summary of the empirical results testing H1A and H1B
Higher repressive capacity
Autocracy

Lower repressive capacity

More resource rents => Less protest

H1B

More oil exports=> Less protest
Hybrid

More oil exports => More protest

Democracy
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H1A

Table 1-8. Summary of the empirical results testing H2A and H2B
Higher taxes Lower taxes
Autocracy
Hybrid

H2B

Democracy

H2A

High resource rents => More protest

Finally, I run robustness models to control for possible endogeneity. I replace the resource
rents and oil exports variables with oil prices and test their effects on protest conditional on
repressive capacity (Appendix H) in rentier hybrid regimes and rentier autocracies and on taxation
(Appendix I) in rentier hybrid regimes and rentier democracies. Models 1 and 2 in Appendix H do
not reveal any significant results suggesting that oil prices moderated by repressive capacity do
not affect chances of protest.
Model 2 in Appendix I that tests the effect of oil prices on protest in rentier democracies
shows that the individual effect of taxes/GDP on protest is positive when the effect of oil prices is
absent. This is consistent with the results in Table 1-5 showing the same effect of taxes/GDP on
protest with oil exports/GDP as the main independent variable. Model 1 that tests the effect of oil
prices on protest in rentier hybrid regimes do not yield any significant results.
The robustness models in Appendix H and Appendix I that control for endogeneity do not
reproduce the same effects as the main models. However, the absence of time fixed effects in the
robustness models could explain the difference in the results from the main models. The oil series
are not country-specific, and invariant across countries.
In sum, the results do not provide empirical evidence for the proposed hypotheses, but
reveal some interesting findings. Higher resource rents and oil exports lower protest likelihood in
rentier autocratic states at higher repressive capacity. Higher oil exports increase chances of protest
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in rentier hybrid regimes at higher repressive capacity. This could be explained by the fact that
economic development resulting from higher oil revenues may lead to changes in class structure
and rise of middle class that will serve as a force for democratization (Dahl, 1971; Huntington,
1991). In the conditions of increased economic development and high repression, calls for
democratizations may increase among the rising middle class. Rentier democracies are not prone
to these effects suggesting that the effects of changes in rents on protest conditioned by higher
repressive capacity is relevant to autocratic and hybrid regimes only. Higher resource rents
increase protest likelihood conditional to lower taxes in hybrid regimes.

Conclusion

This paper explored the question of how economic shocks affect the likelihood of protest in high
resource dependent states with different political regimes. Several studies that address this topic
have suggested a correlation between economic crisis/shocks and protests (e.g. Smith, 2004;
Brancati, 2014). Yet the implications of economic shocks such as commodity price shocks on antigovernment protest are likely to be subject to regime type in rentier states. The research exploring
these links is limited, and this paper sheds light into this topic by finding that the effects of
economic shocks are indeed conditioned by regime type. Using the theoretical and empirical
insights from democratization and rentier state literatures, I have argued that (1) commodity price
shocks increase chances of anti-state protest in rentier autocratic and hybrid regimes conditional
on weaker repressive capacity; (2) commodity price shocks increase chances of anti-state protest
in rentier democratic and hybrid regimes conditional on higher taxation.
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Although the empirical results do not provide support for these expectations, they reveal
other significant findings. These findings contribute to the literature by providing new important
insights to the relationship between economic shocks and protest in various political regimes with
high resource dependency. Protest in rentier democratic regimes are not likely to be affected by
resource/oil rents conditioned by repressive capacity. In rentier autocracies the protest is less likely
when resource rents or net oil exports increase conditioned by higher repressive capacity. In rentier
hybrid regimes, higher net oil exports increase chances of protest suggesting that oil revenues play
a more important role in protest mobilization when conditioned by higher repression. People in
hybrid regimes are also more likely to protest when resource rents are higher conditional to lower
taxation. The findings for hybrid regimes are consistent with modernization and democratization
literature arguments that link higher economic development to protest. The empirical results for
autocratic and democratic regimes are rather counterintuitive suggesting new ways of thinking
about economic shocks and anti-government protest. The individual effect of high repressive
capacity is shown to increase protest likelihood providing support to the arguments in the literature
that repression increases protest proclivity and dissident activity.
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ARTICLE 2: ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST
MOBILIZATION IN COMPETITIVE AUTOCRACIES: THE CASE OF RUSSIA
Introduction

How do economic shocks such as global economic crises affect anti-government protests in
competitive autocracies? Protest literature connects economic grievances associated with income
inequality (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Gupta, 1990; Hibbs, 1973) or relative deprivation (Berkowitz,
1972; Gurr, 1970; Major, 1994) to political protest activity. Democratization literature proposes
that weaker state capacity and grievances resulting from economic shocks lead to democratization
of regimes, which often involves the overthrow of authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2006; Bermeo, 2000; Geddes, 1999; Haggard & Kaufman, 1997; Pepinsky, 2009). More recent
theories that link economic conditions to anti-government protests emphasize the role of economic
crises in fostering pro-democracy protests (Brancati, 2016). This scholarship centers on democracy
protests that make demands on their respective governments to adopt and uphold fair and
democratic elections. Economic crises are argued to increase discontent in society and raise
support for opposition candidates, who are likely to mobilize protests, especially in election
periods (Brancati, 2016). Yet these studies make a broad assumption in examining the link between
economic conditions and protest by implying that economic shocks affect a country and its
population homogeneously, and offering no sub-national evidence of the causal relationship
between economic shocks and protest. In contrast, I contend that a country’s regions may not be
affected by economic shocks to the same extent, and anti-government protest activity will vary by
region based on the severity of the exposure to the shock. This has important implications for
understanding protest dynamics, democratization, and regime stability in competitive autocracies.
Recent studies have shown that important political changes originate at the subnational level
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(Trejo, 2014); and ignoring regional protest dynamics prevents observing important protest trends
that may contribute to significant political change (Lankina, 2015). Furthermore, in electoral
authoritarian systems, the incumbent party support directly depend on both objective changes in
regional GDP and voters’ perceptions of regional economic performance (Rosenfeld, 2018). In
this paper, I expect that the worsening regional economic conditions as a result of economic shocks
are likely to lead to the discontent with the incumbent regime in the form of anti-government
protest in the affected regions. Regions with more integration to the global economy are likely to
be affected more negatively by exogenous economic shocks than regions with less pronounced ties
to the global economy. As a result, I expect the regions that have greater exposure to economic
shocks to experience larger number of anti-government protests. This suggestion has important
implications for democratization processes and regime survival. Regions with high protest
activities are found to have more contested elections in competitive autocracies (Gorokhovskaia,
2017). Furthermore, economic shocks have implications for state fiscal capacity of rentier states
as these states have to find alternative sources of revenue to cover the budget deficit and avoid the
debt crisis. In doing so, the state is likely to increase taxes and other forms of payments to the
budget thereby increasing grievances among population and raising chances of protest.
The Russian case is representative of this scenario. The regime in Russia has been mainly
characterized as competitive authoritarianism (Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Levitsky & Way, 2002;
Remington, 2012). Its 85 federal subjects diverge greatly in the structure of their economies and
levels of economic development, and, therefore, have varying degrees of resilience to economic
crises. Global economic crises are generally accompanied by a sharp reduction of demand for
energy resources, and the subsequent drop in prices of oil. Commodity-exporting countries are
vulnerable to price fluctuations of the world commodity prices, which affect their terms of trade;
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its vulnerability to economic shocks is determined by the exposure to these price changes
(Guillaumont, 1999). Oil revenues on average constituted 46% of Russia’s federal budget revenues
and 9% of its GDP in the 2007-2015 period8. The commodity regions of Russia are likely to be hit
most severely by the shock as it manifests itself in the form of higher unemployment and decreased
gross regional product. This effect, however, is not limited to resource states and their resourceexporting regions. In today’s world of high economic interdependence, all countries are affected
and “a crisis is a stimulus to which all must respond” (Gourevitch, 1986, p.19). In non-resource
states, the severity of the effect depends on the level of integration of local economies in the global
manufacturing supply, domestic financial regulation and links to global finance (Kahler & Lake,
2013).
In sum, I argue that economic shocks play a crucial role in facilitating collective action in
the form of protest in competitive autocracies as state fiscal capacity weakens and economic
grievances increase the public demand on the regional and national governments. The effects,
however, depend on the severity of the exposure of a country’s regions to the exogenous shock –
the higher regional exposure increases chances of anti-government protests. My argument that
rests on economic grievances is not novel as others have already studied this relationship. My
study is unique, though, because I apply and test this argument at the subnational level in a
competitive autocracy where my outcome variable of interest is protest in a given region, which
provides important implications for regime stability and protest research in general.
With the aim of testing my argument, I employ an original dataset of anti-government
protests in Russia that I constructed for the period of 2007-2015 using Russian-language articles.

8

Estimations are made based on the reports of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
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The dataset contains all protests including marches, rallies, pickets, sit-ins, strikes, gatherings, and
other acts of protest, which target the federal, regional and/or local governments. It also includes
protests that make demands on state enterprises. The data is collected at the regional level and
includes the number of anti-government protests by federal subject per year. Using the regional
economic data such as gross regional product, unemployment, mining employment, and tax
increases as measures of economic shock, I test their effects on anti-government protest. Economic
literature has shown that there exists a correlation between oil prices and economic performance
in rentier states. Empirical evidence suggests that higher oil prices have a positive effect on
economic growth in oil exporting states (Berument, Ceylan, & Dogan, 2010). Furthermore, 10%
decrease in oil prices is associated with 2.2% decline in GDP and 4.6% decrease in federal
government revenues in Russia (Rautava, 2004). The projections of economic growth and fiscal
plans are made with the estimations of future oil prices in rentier states like Russia. Based on this
suggestive evidence, I make a plausible assumption that economic performance in rentier states is
significantly associated with commodity prices. Negative changes in the economy are assumed to
be resulting from oil price shocks in the analyzed case of Russia.
Controlling for a variety of other factors, I find that economic conditions that affect
individuals directly such as unemployment are important predictors of protest mobilization
whereas broad economic indicators such as gross regional product do not have a significant effect
on anti-government protest. Lower employment in the mining sector has a significant lagged effect
on protest while regional indirect tax increases are not shown to contribute to higher protest
likelihood. The results hold in several robustness tests and have several important implications for
the literature. First, the findings highlight the importance of exogenous economic shocks for
protest. Second, the findings reveal that specific economic conditions that affect the populace on
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an individual level such as job loss correlate positively with protest emphasizing the importance
of individual preferences in protest participation. Finally, the findings demonstrate that ignoring
subnational variation in protest dynamics in examining the effect of economic crises obscures the
sub-national level mechanisms and variables, and oversimplifies the effect of economic shocks on
anti-government protest mobilization.

Literature Review

Political economy literature centers on explaining policy responses to economic crisis (Gourevitch,
1986; Kahler & Lake, 2013; Pepinsky, 2009) and the effects of economic crisis on regime change
and democratization (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bermeo. 2000; Geddes, 1999; Haggard &
Kaufman, 1997). Most scholarship focused on income inequality to explain protest from economic
perspective (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Gupta, 1990; Hibbs, 1973) and relative deprivation
(Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Major, 1994). Yet this research is dated, and the review of the
studies suggests that economic inequality is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for dissent;
nor that inequality may be actually associated with less political violence because elites in these
societies have the power to suppress all instances of dissent (Lichbach, 1989).
The later studies suggested that political violence is more likely to occur in societies with
both high inequality and mostly immobile capital, i.e. economies with a large share of fixed assets
where the poor has substantial incentives to expropriate the assets (Boix, 2003). Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) have argued that transition to democracy is more likely to occur in societies with
middle levels of inter-group inequality, because in highly unequal societies, the elites have a lot to
lose from the new system that places a greater redistributive burden on them thereby making them
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resort to repression as a response to the demands for democratization. Yet the study does not
provide systematic empirical evidence to support these arguments (Haggard & Kaufmann, 2016).
Some studies find that lower rural inequality is associated with more chances for democratization
(Ansell & Samuels, 2010). Other studies find that inequality does not affect chances of transition
to democracy, but may harm political stability (Dutt & Mittra, 2008) and democratic consolidation
(Houle, 2009). Haggard and Kaufmann (2016) have done the most comprehensive empirical
analysis to date by performing not only cross-national regression analysis but also by considering
all cases of democratic transitions and reversions in the period of 1980 and 2008. They find that
inequality does not drive democratic transitions and reversions even in the cases where these
events are associated with distributive conflict. The authors suggest that the authoritarian regime’s
co-optive or exclusionary policies as well as the public’s ability to manifest their grievances are
likely to determine chances of transitions. The differences in regime’s policies and characteristics
can directly influence chances of protest mobilization. This claim is in line with the arguments on
the importance of various political constraints and incentives that exist in different types of illiberal
regimes (Robertson, 2011). Brancati (2014) conducted a cross- national analysis on the link
between economic conditions and pro-democracy protests and found that anocracies are more
likely to experience these protests than democracies and autocracies (Brancati, 2014). This finding
confirms Robertson’s (2011) argument that chances of protest are highest in hybrid regimes.
Brancati (2014, 2016) further argues that pro-democracy protests become more likely if economic
conditions deteriorate in illiberal regimes as people blame the autocratic nature of their regime for
economic downturns. However, it remains unclear whether it is the economic conditions or the
political factors associated with the regime type and its policies that make protest most likely in
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hybrid regimes during the periods of economic crisis. The conclusion is hard to reach without a
subnational analysis examining the effects of economic conditions on protest in hybrid regimes.
The protest literature suggests that economic grievances are still at the center of most
protests (Salehyan & Stewart, 2016). Groups are more likely to mobilize for both violent and nonviolent politics if they have economic grievances (Cunningham, 2013). In this regard, exogenous
economic shocks play a pivotal role in anti-government protest mobilization and even the
breakdown of authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky, 2009). Indeed, global financial crisis led to mass
protests, violence, and breakdown of authoritarian regime in Indonesia in 1998; a sharp drop in oil
prices triggered deep economic recession in Venezuela and 2014-2017 protests (largest in the
history of Venezuela) that called for the end of the authoritarian rule of President Maduro and early
elections. Some studies have pointed that in electoral autocracies, exogenous shocks in the form
of economic crises usually serve as an initial motivation for protest, and economic crisis is a
powerful predictor of indigenous protest (Trejo, 2014). Yet the existing studies offer no extensive
sub-national level evidence on the causal relationship between economic shocks and antigovernment protest, which may be due to the lack of rich empirical evidence on economic and
demographic characteristics as well as anti-government protest variation across localities. Without
such evidence, the literature tends to assume that the effect of economic crisis on protest is
homogenous – suggesting that economic shocks affect every region of the given country in the
same ways thereby increasing the overall likelihood of anti-government protest. This assumption
makes it difficult to trace the causes of anti-government protest specifically to economic crises,
which may easily conflate with other factors behind protest mobilization.
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Theory and Hypotheses

Political scientists have long argued that economic grievances breed anti-government protests.
Here I define anti-government protest as an act in which “groups of citizens who do not formally
interact with government officials, but who, under certain conditions…organize on an informal,
issue-specific basis to make demands on public officials through pressure processes” (Schumaker,
1975, p. 490). These acts include pickets, rallies, marches, hunger strikes, sit-ins etc.
As Tilly (2004) pointed out, the type of contentious politics that the populace engages in
depends on the type of regime in which protest takes place. This study focuses on explaining
protest mobilization in competitive autocracies when affected by economic shocks, which increase
grievances against the government. It is logical to expect that economic grievances significantly
increase the likelihood of protest mobilization in competitive autocracies, because the populace
does not face high levels of repression as in closed autocracies and has higher levels of belief that
it can reach the goals of protest than in all other types of regimes including democracies
(Robertson, 2011). However, it would be too simple to assume that economic shocks affect the
citizenry in competitive autocracies to the same degree increasing economic grievances equally
across the board and thereby raising the chances of anti-government protest. I take a more nuanced
approach to argue that the likelihood of protest varies with the level of regional exposure to
economic shocks. The level of economic grievances resulting from economic shocks and the
subsequent protest mobilization depend on how severely the regional economies are affected by
the crisis, especially in large states where regional differences may be salient. The higher exposure
to the crisis should result in more anti-government protests in competitive autocracies where
people make demands on the regional and national governments to resolve their grievances and/or
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resign and democratize. In line with the above suggestions, I further lay out arguments that apply
to protest mobilization in competitive autocracies.
Exogenous economic shocks can take the form of global financial or economic crises
resulting in global economic slowdown, decreased demand for goods and services, decreased
production and the subsequent drop in energy and commodity prices. The level of exposure to the
crisis depends on how deeply the national and regional economies are integrated into the global
manufacturing supply and/or their level of dependency on the revenues from commodity exports.
The oil and mining sectors are likely to be hit the hardest when commodity prices fall resulting in
decreased industrial output, wage arrears, and layoffs in the affected regions. In competitive
autocracies, affected citizens are likely to engage in various forms of protest to make demands on
their employers. If their employers do not meet the demands, protesters can pressure their regional
governments through pickets, rallies, and hunger strikes with the expectation that the governments
can either exert influence on employers through negotiations, formal investigations, and penalties,
or that the government compensates unpaid wages to the protesters in case of enterprise
bankruptcies. In some cases, employees of bankrupt enterprises may demand that the government
takes the ownership of the enterprise and keeps them employed or provides them with alternative
employment through creation of new workplaces. This sentiment is likely to be further fueled by
opposition forces that get actively involved in organizing anti-government protests with the goal
of achieving their own long-term political goals. Scholars have argued that opposition has
incentives to mobilize protest (Reuter & Robertson, 2015; Robertson, 2011; Trejo, 2014) and may
take advantage of the increased discontent in the times of economic crisis to claim electoral fraud
even when it is not present (Brancati, 2016). To the extent that grievances motivate protest (Gurr,
1970), the spatial variation of these protests within a competitive autocracy will depend on the
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severity of regional exposure to economic shocks. If this argument is correct, we would expect to
find evidence for the following hypotheses.
H1: Regions that see higher levels of decreased output over time are more likely to
experience larger number of anti-government protests.
H2: Regions that see higher levels of unemployment over time are more likely to experience
larger number of anti-government protests.
The first and second hypotheses are based on grievance arguments. In some cases,
however, the protests may also be stimulated by fiscal policy changes that governments implement
as a response to these exogenous shocks. Governments respond to international economic crises
through various economic and fiscal policy changes (Gourevitch, 1986; Kahler & Lake, 2013;
Pepinsky, 2009). An overwhelming evidence in the economic literature suggests that most nonG7 industrial countries and most developing countries implement a procyclical fiscal policy when
affected by economic shocks (Alesina, Tabellini, & Campante, 2008; Gavin & Perotti, 1997;
Kaminski, Reinhart, & Vegh, 2004; Talvi & Vegh, 2004). Procyclical fiscal policy implies that
tax rates increase during recessions and decrease during booms while spending goes up in booms
(Alesina et al., 2008). Therefore, we can expect that in competitive autocracies, national and/or
regional governments are likely to increase taxes to cover a budget deficit and avoid a debt crisis.
Several factors may account for this increase. First, decreased revenues of corporations and
businesses that suffered from economic shocks are likely to result in lower tax revenues for the
governments at regional levels. Second, the governments are likely to see income tax revenues
decline as a result of decreased regional employment. Finally, regional government spending needs
to increase during economic recessions due to higher claims for unemployment benefits and other
benefits that arise due to rising inflation and other adverse economic conditions. National
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governments may see the need to increase subsidies for the economically disadvantaged regions
to bail them out or give them autonomy to raise regional taxes to raise revenues for their budgets.
Moreover, in rentier autocracies, economic shocks decrease government revenues from
commodity exports. In these conditions, the national and regional governments are likely to raise
revenues through increases in taxes, duties and other payments to the budget. In keeping with my
general arguments though, I posit that economic shocks do not affect all regional budgets equally,
and adverse fiscal changes are stipulated by the structure of the regional economy and the level of
integration of regional economy into the global economy. This suggestion would explain why we
would expect to see spatial variation in tax increases within an affected state. The regions that
increase taxes that negatively affect the individual incomes of its residents are likely to see
economic grievances rise that are likely to spill out in protests. The evidence from economic
literature suggests that workers’ income is affected proportionately by weak economic conditions,
which should lead to a relatively larger participation of people in public protests (Campante &
Chor, 2012). In these protests, citizens pursue the goal of policy changes that would address their
grievances. Specifically, they expect concessions from the regional governments in the form of
abolition of tax increases. This suggestion is based on the assumption that regions have the power
to determine their own tax policy as in federal systems of government. This leads to my next
proposition:
H3: Regions that increase taxes that affect individual income negatively are more likely to
experience larger number of anti-government protests.

55

The role of economic grievances in Russian politics
In the poll conducted by Levada Center in November 2017, 49% of Russians said that President
Putin was responsible for the problems in the country and for the increase in the cost of living,
45% blamed the government, 30% thought Dmitry Medvedev was responsible, and 27% thought
that the governors and local authorities were to blame.9 Treisman (2011) finds that public
assessment of economic performance determines the levels of presidential ratings in Russia. While
elections present an opportunity to change the status quo for the citizenry and to gain power for
the opposition candidates, anti-government protests may occur in any given period when
economic, political and/or social conditions become unacceptable for the populace.
How important are economic grievances in fostering protest mobilization in Russia? Most
scholars on Russian politics agree that material values that benefit individuals directly are
prioritized over abstract freedoms in Russia (Remington, 2012), and that Russians are more likely
to participate in protests if the issue at the center of protests directly affects them or their families
(Evans, 2012). In a poll conducted in 2010, more than half of the respondents said that the freedom
to be protected by the state in case of illness, loss of work or poverty and the freedom to purchase
what I want as the most important personal freedoms (Remington, 2012). This could be explained
by socialist legacy of Russia. Large body of literature posits that socialist legacy creates strong
individual preferences for greater income equality and state redistributive policies in the postsocialist states (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Boeri, Börsch-Supan, Tabellini, Moene, & Lockwood,
2001; Corneo & Gruner, 2002; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom, 2003; Shiller, Boycko, & Korobov,
1991). The results of multiple public opinion surveys over the past twelve years have consistently

9

Respondents could choose several options when answering the question. The results of the survey are available
at https://www.levada.ru/2017/12/11/17232/
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shown that rising prices, poverty, unemployment and economic crises are the top issues that
respondents considered to be the most critical and personally concerning to them.10 Only 1-4% of
the respondents in these surveys said that restriction of civil rights and democratic freedoms
(freedom of speech and press) was an important issue. This evidence demonstrates the importance
of economic issues over others and pragmatic views of democracy in Russia. Moreover, more
people are likely to associate democracy with economic well-being in the times of economic crises.
Public opinion surveys showed that most respondents in Russia defined democracy as economic
well-being in 2008 and 2009 whereas in all previous years the majority of the respondents said
that democracy was freedom of speech, press, and religion.11 The recent studies find that the
demands made in the 2011-2013 protests in Russia were too diverse; they did not necessarily
represent democratic claims; and a few protesters actually rallied for democracy (Chaisty &
Whitefield, 2013; Rosenberg, 2017). The results of election monitoring in Russia show that the
2011 and 2012 election campaigns were dominated by the sentiments of uncertainty resulting from
the economic crisis, lack of organizational consensus (conditions of public sentiments concerning
the hopes of better living standards, better living conditions, increase of optimism etc.), decreased
approval ratings of the parties in power, president and prime-minister during 2011, and
unfavorable election campaign of United Russia, which could not mobilize its supporters (Volkov,
2012). There were also prevailing sentiments of the lack of perception of economic stability, which
was the main achievement of Putin’s government that was used as a trump card in 2007-2008
elections (Volkov, 2012). This evidence suggests that seemingly pro-democracy protests that take
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The results of the surveys are available at https://www.levada.ru/2017/03/07/samye-ostrye-problemy/
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Respondents could choose several options when answering the question. The results of the survey are available
at https://www.levada.ru/2010/01/20/chto-takoe-demokratiya-i-nuzhna-li-ona-rossii/
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place in Russia still center on the inability of the government to remedy the economic grievances
of the populace.

Economic shocks and protest in Russia
On March 11, 2009, over one thousand employees of the mining sector enterprises, former
employees of the mining sector who lost their jobs as a result of the economic crisis, and the trade
union representatives took the streets in the city of Dalnegorsk of the Primorskiy Kray demanding
lower utility tariffs and compensation of wage arrears. The demands targeted the regional
authorities. The chairman of the regional committee of the "Roskhimprofsoyuz", the chemical
industry workers’ union, Maxim Saenko stated: “Because of the crisis, it was the mining
enterprises of Primorye that suffered the most, since their products are export-oriented. The
demand has fallen, people are left without work and wages, people are in despair!” The cityforming enterprise of Dalnegorsk "Dalpolimetall" had long been idle, more than three thousand
people were left without work. Employees of the enterprise were receiving only a small part of
their salaries, which already did not exceed nine thousand rubles. A similar situation existed in
other enterprises of the mining industry. In the Svetlogorsk settlement of Primosrkiy Kray at the
“Russian Wolfram” enterprise about 200 people were left without work. The Yaroslavl Mining
Plant transferred 700 people, which is half of the company's employees, to a four-day working
week. People lost twenty percent in salary. Wage arrears had persisted at the "BOR" mining
enterprise in Dalnegorsk. At the same time, tariffs for housing and utilities services had increased
by an average of 20-25 percent since January 2009. For those who pay for an apartment and
electricity, there was no money left for food. Moreover, their cost had significantly increased due
to the depreciation of the ruble.
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The Dalnegorsk protest is representative of the situation that had developed in the Russian
mining sector as a result of the global economic crisis. Unemployment, wage arrears, and rising
cost of living made people protest making demands on the federal and regional governments in
the affected regions of the Russian Federation.
On January 30th, 2010, about 7,000-12,000 people in Kaliningrad protested against the
50% increase in transport tax in the region and higher customs duties for imported cars. It was the
largest of the series of related protests that occurred in the region in the 2009-2010 period. The
regional transport tax increase in Kaliningrad made the transport tax one of the highest in the
Russian Federation. The protesters demanded the resignation of the federal government and the
resignation of the United Russia party in the State Duma. In November 2009, Russia allowed its
federal subjects to increase the base rate of transport tax by no more than ten times to raise
additional revenues to the regional budgets following a sharp decline of oil prices as a result of the
global economic crisis. President Putin also signed the decree to increase customs duties for
imported cars at the federal level in December 2008 with the purpose to help the Russian auto
industry that suffered losses as a result of the economic crisis as well as to help the assembly plants
of the foreign automobile manufacturers that employ thousands of Russian citizens. These changes
resulted in all-Russian campaigns of mass protests. Not all regions opted to increase regional taxes,
but some regions that increased taxes experienced large protests such as those in Kaliningrad. As
a result of mass protests, Kaliningrad’s regional legislative body adopted the new law reversing
the previous increases. Under the new legislation, the tax increases of 15-20% affected only the
owners of motorcycles, autobuses, and heavy trucks. Kaliningrad, a city located in an exclave
bordered by Poland and Lithuania, has a population of 941,873 people, which means that about
1% of its population participated in the protest. The protest size was unprecedented for Kaliningrad
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and revealed the ability of adverse economic changes to mobilize citizens for protests against the
government.
Two large-scale anti-regime uprisings in 2011 and 2012 both described as the largest since
the early 1990s received the attention of all major international media outlets because about
80,000-100,000 people took on the streets in Moscow, which, although large, is still less than 1%
of Moscow’s population of 11.5 million. However, despite the size and scale of the 2011 and 2012
protests, the total number of anti-government protests across Russia in these years was
significantly lower than in previous periods as shown in Figure 2-1. Therefore, the common
perception that Russian protest movement was dormant until the 2011 elections is flawed.
According to the new protest dataset, Russia experienced the largest number of anti-government
protests in 2008-2010 period following the global financial crisis and a sharp drop in oil prices in
the second half of 2008; the number of protests steadily declined from 2010 to 2015 period
reaching its minimum in 2015 as shown in Figure 2-1.
Global economic crises are accompanied by a sharp reduction of demand for energy
resources, and the subsequent drop in prices of oil. Russia, a rentier competitive autocracy, saw its
GDP and state revenues decline as a result of sharp decreases in oil prices following the 2008
global financial crisis. Oil revenues on average constituted 46% of Russia’s federal budget
revenues and 9% of its GDP in the 2007-2015 period12. The country recorded GDP growth of 8.5%
in 2007, 5.3% in 2008, and -7.8% in 2009 (World Bank, 2016). The data from the new dataset of
anti-government protests, 2007-2015 shows that the number of anti-government protests in Russia

12

Estimations are made based on the reports of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
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was highest in the 2008-2010 period (Figure 2-1). This evidence is in line with my expectation
that we should see more anti-government protests in the times of economic crisis.
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Figure 2-1. Number of anti-government protests in Russia, 2007-2015
Further, the regional distribution of anti-government protests in Russian Federation in
2007-2015 is depicted in Figure 2-2. The map reveals that Moscow (1,703 protests) and Saint
Petersburg (509 protests) had the largest number of protests during this period, which is not
surprising as these two cities have always been Russia’s center of political life and civil society. It
is more interesting to see how the distribution of protests varied across the remaining regions of
the Russian Federation during this period. The third largest protest-prone region is Samara (299
protests) marked as orange zone on the map. Samara is located in the Volga economic district that
produces 14% of Russia’s oil. Russia has eleven economic districts (Appendix J). The yellow zone
(108-187 protests) include the regions belonging to the Volga, Volga-Vyatka, Ural, West Siberian,
North Caucasus, and Central Black Earth economic districts. Most of the regions in the yellow
zone are major centers of Russia’s fuel and energy (oil and gas), mining, and metallurgy industries.
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The regions in the green zone (48-101 protests) belong to the same economic districts as the
regions in the yellow zone as well as to the East Siberian, Northern, and Far Eastern economic
districts.
The Northwestern (excluding Saint Petersburg) and Central districts (excluding Moscow
City) are in the zone with the least number of protests. Despite being the most populous, the Central
economic district (excluding Moscow City) has a small number of protests. The Central district is
not endowed with natural resources, and its economy is mostly based on machinery and
engineering; it is also the most prosperous economic district in Russia. Both of these facts can
explain its low protest activity. The Northwestern region is also poor in natural resources; its
economy is mostly based on engineering and metalworking.
It should be noted that the Far Eastern district (with the exception of Primor’ye) and parts
of the East and West Siberian districts have a very low protest activity (blue zone). These regions
are less populous than others and have a low population density. Most of them are ethnic subjects
of Russia (Yamalo-Nenets, Khanty-Mansi, Tuva, Sakha, Chukotka, Buryatiya, and Jewish
Autonomous Region). Similarly, the low protest activity regions of the Northern economic district
such as Komi, Karelia, and Nenets Autonomous Region are also ethnic regions of the district.
Finally, all ethnic federal subjects of the North Caucasus regions with the exception of Dagestan
are also in the blue zone of low protest. In general, the ethnic regions in Russia are known to have
a very small presence of mainstream opposition that views them as regions with low protest
potential.
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Figure 2-2. Regional distribution of anti-government protests in the Russian Federation, 2007-2015
13

Labels for three federal subjects with the highest number of protests, i.e. Moscow City is in the red zone (1,703), St. Petersburg and Samara are in orange
zone (299-509).
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Research Design

Table 2-1 provides the summary statistics for all dependent and independent variables used to
test the hypotheses.

Table 2-1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Obs Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Protests

720

8.502778 25.64397 0

295

GRP per capita

720

259.9029 215.6466 40.5726

1699.933

Unemployment (FSLE)

720

2.48625

66

5.154065 .3

Max

Unemployment (labor surveys) 720

7.845556 6.046759 .8

53.3

Mining Employment

720

1.835833 3.001297 0

18.9

CPI

720

109.7872 3.121272 101.4

120.5

State employment

719

.0148326 .0068516 .0060066 .0618889

Ethnic population

720

26.12989 24.87109 5.027225 99.22066

Higher education

720

19.81767 3.761131 11.53101 40.11212

Population

720

1785707

1710068

50526

1.15e+07

Anti-government protest dataset
To test my argument, I use the dataset of anti-government protests in Russia, 2007-2015 that I
constructed using http://www.namarsh.ru/ website that contains daily information in Russian
language on all protests from every region of the Russian Federation from 2007 to present. The
website is founded and funded by a prominent opposition activist Gary Kasparov. It is run by a
team of activists who rely on a large network of regional reporters for protest dispatches, and it
also reports protests events from other news and media outlets. One can expect the opposition to
exaggerate the scale of protests. However, this issue should not be of concern for the purposes of
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this paper, because the dependent variable is the number of protests rather than the number of
participants. In most cases, the website reports each protest giving the details about organizers,
scale, and police presence complemented by photos. Therefore, there is a minimal chance that the
reported story on protest is fabricated.
My dataset contains all protests including marches, rallies, pickets, sit-ins, strikes,
gatherings, and other acts of protest, which target the federal, regional and/or local governments.
It also includes protests that make demands on state enterprises. The data is collected at the federal
subject level and includes information on the date, target, target level (federal, regional, and/or
local government), actor, actor type, number of protesters, demands, repression and repression
level including number of people arrested and use of force by police.

Dependent variable
I create a count variable of anti-government protests in each federal subject in a given year, which
is the dependent variable in my analysis. The sample data includes 80 federal subjects for which
data are available across all variables.14

Independent variable
The independent variable is relative exposure to economic shock at regional level. I use
four different measures of exposure: (1) gross regional product per capita (GRP per capita)

14

The Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol are not included in the analysis as they became federal subjects of the
Russian Federation in 2014 and there is a lack of data across most of the analyzed variables. The Federal State
Statistics Service (FSSS) does not report the gross regional product per capita (GRP per capita) data for the KhantyMansi Autonomous Region and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region, but their data are subsumed by Tyumen
Oblast, and the data for the Nenets Autonomous Region are part of the data reported by Arkhangelsk Oblast. The
data for these three federal subjects are consolidated in the data of the larger federal subjects.
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denominated in Russian rubles, (2) regional unemployment rate, (3) regional employment rate in
the mining sector, and (4) regional tax increase. The Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) does
not provide data on regional dependence on commodity exports, which presents a limitation in the
measures of exposure to commodity price shocks. One may argue that the changes in the measures
that are used in this paper may not be true representations of the exposure to external economic
shocks, and the changes may result from domestic sources. However, based on empirical evidence
presented earlier in the paper, decreases in commodity prices have significant negative impacts on
the economies of Russia and MENA countries (Berument, Ceylan, & Dogan, 2010; Rautava,
2004). Moreover, in the today’s world of high economic interdependence, even the economies of
non-resource exporting countries are directly linked and deeply integrated into the global system
of manufacturing and finance (Kahler & Lake, 2013). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the
external economic shocks result in decreased output and layoffs, and we should see the negative
changes reflected in the regional output levels per capita and unemployment rates. The literature
finds that unemployment is one of the factors that is correlated with the mass protests of the Arab
Spring (Campanti & Chor, 2012). The Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) reports two different
estimates of unemployment rate: (1) unemployment rate for the end of year according to the data
provided by the Federal Service of Labor and Employment (FSLE), and (2) average
unemployment rate for the year according to the selected labor force surveys on employment
problems. I use the first measure of unemployment rate reported by the FSLE in main models. I
use the second estimate of unemployment reported in labor surveys in robustness models and
report the results in the Appendices.
We should also expect to see more layoffs in the mining sector as economic shocks are
normally associated with the sharp drops in commodity prices. The effects of the economic shocks
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on Russia are, however, mostly expected to be associated with decreases in oil prices because of
the heavy dependency of the Russian economy on oil and gas exports. The data for the mining
sector employment include the employment in the energy and fuel industries as well as other
extracting industries. Although the mining employment includes employment in production of
other commodities besides oil and gas, it is still a good proxy as oil and gas production dominate
Russia’s exports among other commodities.
Finally, the qualitative evidence presented in the theoretical section shows that Russia
experienced large protests following transport tax increases as a result of global economic crisis
and drop in oil prices. The increases were associated with the need to generate revenue for the
regional budgets. I record the transport tax increases for each federal subject coding them as 1 or
0.15

Control variables
I rely on the data reported by the Federal State Statistics Service (FSSS) for all of my control
variables. Control variables include CPI, higher education, ethnic makeup, and state sector
employment. High prices, operationalized as consumer price index (CPI), is an economic issue
that Russians consistently rank the highest in public opinion surveys among the most important
problems16.
Higher education is another factor that have shown to affect protest behavior in Russia.
The survey data on the 2011-2012 protests in Moscow revealed that most protesters were college-

15

16

All transport tax increases in the period of 2008-2014. Data obtained from each region’s government website
and http://taxpravo.ru
The results of the surveys are available at https://www.levada.ru/2017/03/07/samye-ostrye-problemy/
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educated professionals (Rosenfeld, 2017; Volkov, 2012). For this measure, I take the percent of
population with university degree in each federal subject.
I also control for ethnic makeup of the Russia’s federal subjects. My protest data shows
that Russia’s ethnic republics tend to have fewer protests than regions where ethnic majority is
Russian. For example, in the examined period of 2007-2015, there were 581 anti-government
protest events (26% of all observations and 9% of total protest events) in ethnic regions of Russia
where the ethnic population composed at least 40%. In comparison, 5,541 protest events took place
in regions (74% of all observations and 91% of all protest events) where ethnic population was
less than 40%.17 This can be explained by small presence of mainstream opposition groups that
see ethnic republics as regions with low protest potential, economic dependence of economically
disadvantaged ethnic regions on federal subsidies and transfers, as well as more repressive nature
of the local governments in some ethnic republics like Chechnya and Dagestan. I create the ethnic
population variable by subtracting the percentage of ethnic Russian population from 100 in each
federal subject. Finally, I control for employment in state-sector as it has been found to directly
affect anti-government protest participation (Rosenfeld, 2017). I take the percentage of state-sector
employment of total population as it allows for a more precise estimation than taking the sheer
number of people employed in state sector as each federal subject has different population size.
The count dependent variables face the problem of proportionality when estimating the
effects of independent variables, and this problem can be rectified with the use of exposure
variables. An exposure or offset variable is used to compare counts over different variables with
different dimensions. Because the protest data includes number of protests in federal subjects with

17

At the lower threshold of 25% of ethnic population, the number of protests in ethnic regions was 781 (30% of
total observations and 12% of total protest events), and in predominantly Russian regions the number of
protests equaled 5,399 (70% of total observations and 88% of total protest events).
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different dimensions, i.e. population, it is necessary to model the rate of protest that is proportional
to the subject’s population. I model the rate of protest that is proportional to the federal subject’s
population using population as an exposure variable.

Statistical estimation
The number of anti-government protests is a count data requiring the use of count models. Poisson
regression is normally understood to be the basic model for count data on which other count models
are based (Hilbe, 2011). However, Poisson models are subject to the condition of equidispersion
that assumes that mean and variance of the Poisson PDF are equal, i.e. α=1 (Hilbe, 2011). The
regression results showed overdispersion as α=1.32, which violates the equidispersion assumption
of Poisson models. Therefore, I test my argument with negative binomial regression analysis,
which is normally used to model overdispersed Poisson count data when α is greater than 1.25
(Hilbe, 2011). I use the year and federal district fixed effects and cluster the results by eight federal
districts to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the year and district level and restrict analysis
to within a given district. There are no excess zeroes in the dependent variable, which alleviates
the need to use zero inflated negative binomial models.
Including different measures of exposure to economic shocks in the same regression model
may create the problem of collinearity and make the individual effect of each measure
unidentifiable. Table 2-2 shows the correlation matrix of these variables. The matrix reveals that
GRP per capita and mining employment are highly correlated, and, therefore, I separate mining
employment into the second model.
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Table 2-2. Correlation matrix of exposure to economic shock measures
GRP
capita

per Unemploymen
t

Mining

Tax increase

employment

GRP per capita

1

Unemployment

-0.28

1

Mining

0.59

-0.02

1

-0.04

0.05

-0.02

employment
Tax increase

1

Empirical Results

I present the results of the regression testing the effects of economic shocks on anti-government
protests in Table 2-3. The first model includes four measures of exposure to economic shock:
regional GRP per capita, regional unemployment, and regional transport tax increase. The results
show that regional unemployment (p<0.05) is a powerful predictor of anti-government protest.
Higher levels of unemployment are shown to result in more protests. This is consistent with the
expectation that economic shocks result in layoffs and directly affect the personal well-being of
individuals, which contributes to the increased level of grievances against the government that is
generally blamed for its ineffectiveness in dealing with economic problems. Russia’s socialist
legacy also contributes to the increased expectations of the affected populace on the government
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in providing or creating jobs for the unemployed. These expectations can take the form of demands
expressed through protest activities. Unemployment also increases propensity to protest as
unemployed become more vulnerable in dealing with economic issues and often struggle in paying
for utilities and food items.
Regional transport tax increases are not shown to have a significant impact on protest
mobilization. Transport tax increases and the level of the increases in Russia were left at each
region’s discretion, which means that in some regions the hikes did not take place, in some regions
they were significant whereas in others increases were incremental or very low and may have gone
unnoticed. The variation in the level of increases could explain why transport tax increases do not
reach a statistical significance in regression models. In the case of Kaliningrad protests, the tax
increases were very large making them one of the highest in Russia, which explains why the
increase resulted in mass protests in the region. The effects of regional transport tax on protest are
difficult to capture with a binary variable used in this paper due to the regional variation based on
the magnitude of the increases, which are determined by the local authorities. However, creating
a continuous variable for a single tax rate increase for each region presents a challenge. There are
different vehicle types in Russia’s transport tax code that include cars, motorcycles, snowmobiles,
hydrocycles, yachts etc., subdivided by engine power accounting for about thirty different items
taxed at different rates. In most cases the increases were not uniform and may have affected only
certain vehicle types with certain engine powers. Moreover, an impact of the yacht tax increase on
protest is not likely to be the same as an impact of the automobile tax increase making the
comparison difficult. It is also possible that indirect tax increases, i.e. transport tax increase, may
have a limited negative impact on the individual economic well-being of citizenry as opposed to
direct tax increases, i.e. income tax increase. Therefore, unemployment may be a better measure
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of economic shock as its measure is a continuous variable, and its negative effects on economic
well-being of an individual may be more direct and pronounced that indirect tax increases.
A decrease in GRP per capita is not found to be a significant predictor of anti-government
protest. Although this variable does reflect the decrease in output per capita, it has a less tangible
effect on population than unemployment, and, therefore, its effects are not likely to be felt on an
individual level. Unemployment, therefore, may be a more precise measure of economic shock, as
it allows to better gauge the localized effects of economic shocks on the individual economic wellbeing, which is necessary to motivate protest participation.
Higher education is the only control variable that shows statistical significance (p<0.01) in
Model 1, as regions with more college-educated populace are more likely to be politically active
and engage in public protests. This finding is consistent with the democratization literature
arguments that identifies middle class as the main force behind democratization processes (e.g.
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Huntington, 1991). Similarly, modernization theories also
emphasized the role of the middle class (e.g. Dahl, 1971). Middle class is associated with and
defined by scholars as the “university-educated white-collar strata” (Rosenfeld, 2017, p. 638).
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that middle class acts as a driving force for democratization
because unlike the poor they are less in favor of radical policies, and, therefore, the rich becomes
less fearful of democracy and is less likely to rely on repression as the middle-class grows in size.
Middle class may also place demands on elites for democratization (Dahl, 1971; Huntington,
1991). Moreover, in case of hybrid regimes such as Russia, the educated and informed citizens
are more likely to take interest in politics, become active participants of civil society, and make
demands on the government, and therefore, the correlation of the higher education variable with
protest in the results of this study is not surprising.
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The second model tests the hypothesis with unemployment, mining employment, and tax
increase as independent variables. Tax increase and GRP per capita remain not significant while
unemployment (p<0.05) stays statistically significant, further providing support for the hypothesis
and reinforcing the results reported in the first model. The lower mining employment is also shown
to result in larger number of anti-government protests, however, the p-value in this finding equals
0.05 almost reaching statistical significance. Although it does not reach the statistical significance
at p<0.05 by a very small margin, it is still an important finding. It is consistent with the expectation
that lower oil and commodity prices lead to decreased production resulting in less people employed
in the sector. This measure may be even a more precise measure of economic shock than
unemployment rate in general, because it allows to gauge the effects of decreased commodity
exports on protest. Like unemployment, it also affects people on individual level as people who
lose jobs as a result of oil and commodity price crisis experience economic hardships and
grievances that spill out in protests demanding that the government rectify the economic problems
of the affected individuals. The protests in Dalnegorsk in the Primorskiy Kray region of Russia in
March 2009 are an example of the global economic crisis having a devastating impact on the
mining industry leaving thousands of people unemployed and on the brink of poverty.
Higher education again shows (p<0.01) that propensity to protest increases with more
educated citizenry. In both Models 1 and 2, CPI, state sector employment, and ethnicity do not
demonstrate an effect on anti-government protest in Russia.
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Table 2-3. Negative binomial analysis of economic shocks and anti-government protest, 20072015
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita

-.001
(.001)

Unemployment

.04**
(.01)

.04**
(.01)

Mining employment

-.08
(.04)

Tax increase

.12
(.43)

.12
(.45)

CPI

-.04
(.02)

-.05**
(.02)

State sector employment

-2.96
(21.95)

-2.82
(19.91)

Ethnic population

-.01
(.01)

-.01
(.01)

Higher education

.08**
(.02)

.07**
(.01)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=719.
Although these results provide strong support for H2 (p<0.01) and limited support for H4
at a lower statistical significance threshold (p<.10), the business cycle models of protest suggest
that the effects of economic shocks on protest may not be immediate. Therefore, I run another set
of regressions lagging the economic variables by one year. The results are presented in Table 2-4.
Again, in both models higher levels of lagged unemployment are shown to result in more anti74

government protests (p<0.01). Lagged mining employment is significant as well (p<0.05)
suggesting that decreased employment in the mining sector in the previous year is likely to result
in more anti-government protests in the following year. Transport tax increases have no effect on
anti-government protest in both models.
These results suggest that the effects of economic shock that affect the population on the
individual level such as unemployment and lower employment in mining sector result in
grievances that persist over longer periods of time leading to increased protest activity. The mining
sector employment reaches statistical significant at p<0.05 level in lagged models. The coefficient
also becomes larger when the variable is lagged. Unlike other occupation types, people employed
in the mining sector may find it more difficult to find alternative employment due to the very
specific nature of their jobs. This may be particularly applicable to the uneducated workers in the
mining sector; the literature suggests that unskilled workers are less easily moved from one kind
of production to another than skilled workers (Krasner, 1976). Therefore, it does make sense that
we may actually see grievances of the unemployed from the mining sector increase over time as
people may become more frustrated the longer they remain unemployed, which exacerbates their
economic hardships and grievances and increases their proclivity to protest against the
government.
GRP per capita and transport tax increases do not reach statistical significance as in
previous models suggesting that the lagged effect of these variable does not have an effect on antigovernment protest. This finding further reinforces the argument made in the previous section that
the decreased output and indirect taxation do not have the strong individual level effects that
unemployment does. Higher education is the only control variable that persistently shows high
level of impact (p<0.01) on anti-government protest in all regression models suggesting to be a
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very powerful predictor of protest. Overall, the results suggest that the effects of economic shocks,
specifically measured by unemployment, on protest are enduring. Economic shock caused by a
sharp and prolonged drop in oil prices results in deteriorated economic conditions in Russia until
the prices return to previous levels, which means that its effect on anti-government protest can also
persist over time.
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Table 2-4. Negative binomial analysis of economic shocks and anti-government protest, 20072015 with time lags
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita t-1

-.001
(.001)

Unemployment t-1

.02*
(.01)

.02*
(.01)

Mining employment t-1

-.09*
(.04)

Tax increases t-1

-.15
(.31)

-.21
(.30)

CPI t-1

-.03
(.04)

-.04
(.04)

-1.49
(22.44)

6.96
(20.16)

Ethnic population

-.01
(.01)

-.01
(.01)

Higher education

.09**
(.02)

.07**
(.01)

State sector employment t-1

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=639.

As mentioned in the research design section of this paper, Russia reports two different
estimates of unemployment rate. For robustness purposes, I use the second estimate of
unemployment rate according to the selected labor force surveys on employment problems and
report the results in the Appendices. The reported numbers in the second estimate of
unemployment rate are higher than those in the first estimate. Unemployment remains statistically
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significant (p<0.01) in all models (Appendix K and Appendix L) further reinforcing the main
results. Mining employment is significant at (p<0.05) in lagged models (Appendix L), but reaches
p<0.10 significance in Appendix K models that do not lag the variables. This is also in line with
the results reported in the main models.
Further, as an additional robustness test, I employ logit analysis to see if my argument
holds when protests are coded as binary variables rather than counts of protest events. I code
whether there was a protest event regardless of the number of protests in each federal subject in
the 2007-2015 period and test the argument using the same independent and control variables as
previously except I include population as a control variable because logit models do not allow the
use of exposure variables. I present the results of the logit regression analysis in Appendix M. Yet
again, unemployment is shown to increase the likelihood of anti-government protest in both
models. However, in contrast to the expectations and the results of the negative binomial models,
mining employment does not appear to affect chances of protest in logit regression models. This
finding suggests that mining employment may not affect chances of protests but rather the number
of protests. This could mean that the regions with low protest potential such as the ethnic republics
of Russia may not be affected by negative changes in the mining employment, however, changes
in mining employment may increase the number of protests in regions with medium-to-high protest
potential. In fact, the regression results in Appendix M show that non-Russian ethnicity is
associated with less chances of anti-government protest (p<0.01), which does indicate that ethnic
regions tend to protest less than the regions where the majority population is Russian. Another
possible explanation is that the negative changes in mining employment increase the number of
protests in the regions where mining sector dominates the economy, while other regions with the
absence of mining sector or its low presence will not be affected by this factor. State sector

78

employment also appears to reduce chances of anti-government protest, which is consistent with
the previous findings in the literature (e.g. Rosenfeld, 2017). GRP per capita, higher education,
CPI, and population fail to achieve statistical significance in logit regression models.
Next, I lag the variables by one year similar to what I did in the main part of the analysis
and present the results in Appendix N. The same variables reach statistical significance as in the
models without time lags in Appendix M suggesting that the effects of unemployment are
enduring.
In additional robustness tests, I use the second measure of unemployment with and without
time lags in logit regression models as in the main analysis to see how the results are affected.
Appendices O and P show the results of these tests. All variables perform the same as in the logit
analysis using the first measure of unemployment.
Overall, the empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that economic shocks
increase the likelihood of anti-government protests in Russia. The findings suggest that economic
conditions that affect individuals directly such as unemployment and lagged lower mining
employment that escalate grievances in these periods are important predictors of protest
mobilization in Russia. Changes in employment levels in the mining sector of Russia are especially
important given that this particular sector is impacted more than other sectors as oil prices drop
resulting in decreased production and layoffs thereby increasing the pool of aggrieved citizens that
blame the government for its ineffectiveness in dealing with the economic crisis. On the other
hand, regional transport tax increases and GRP per capita are not shown to be strong predictors of
anti-government protest. Mobilizing protest events that cite vague economic factors such lower
growth of regional product may not stimulate enough interest or motivate protest participation
among the Russian populace unless protesters can feel the negative effects of these conditions on
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their personal well-being. Indirect tax increases in the form of transport tax may not also have a
sufficient force to stimulate anti-government protest mobilization. Grievances among the vehicle
owners may vary based on the level of increases left at the discretion of regional authorities. Small
increases are not likely to result in anti-government sentiment whereas large increases may, and
that variation may need to be incorporated into and accounted for in the analysis to better gauge
the effects of indirect tax increases on protest.

Conclusion
The findings in this paper provide empirical evidence that economic grievances resulting from
exogenous shocks increase anti-government protest mobilization in Russia. This effect is based on
the assumption and empirical evidence in the literature that external economic shocks have
significant negative effects on regional economies considering high level of economic
interdependence and exposure to price shocks for commodity exporting countries. These findings
not only confirm the results of public opinion surveys that have consistently shown that economic
issues are at the forefront of the individual priorities of the Russian citizenry, but also reveal the
specific factors and mechanisms through which these grievances manifest themselves in the form
of anti-government protests. This paper’s framework suggests several reasons why we should see
more anti-government protests in the times of economic crises in Russia. Russia as a resourcedependent country relies on oil and commodity exports for a large share of its state revenues. A
sharp drop in global oil and commodity prices adversely affects the Russian economy and
economic well-being of its citizens. Economic shock manifests itself in the form of decreased
production, layoffs, and tax increases causing mass grievances and protests. Decreased production
levels translate into reduced number of work shifts, less wages, wage arrears, and even bankruptcy
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and layoffs thereby increasing the pool of aggrieved citizens that blame the government for its
ineffectiveness in dealing with economic crisis. The effects on protest, however, depend on the
exposure of the region to the economic shocks. Again, even though the effects are not directly
observed, the assumption of economic interdependence and exposure to commodity prices in
rentier economies provide strong reasons to believe the effects are driven by economic shocks.
Unemployment is found to be a strong predictor of anti-government protest at the regional level,
while decreased output and regional tax increases do not seem to affect regional protest
mobilization in significant ways. Mining employment has also shown to be significant lagged
effect on protest mobilization.
The findings have implications not only for Russia but for other competitive authoritarian
regimes as well because they have similar levels of political openness and political participation
constraints. Moreover, the findings contribute to the larger protest literature by showing that local
economic conditions increase chances of all types of anti-government protests at the regional level.
It shows that the effects of shocks on protest are not homogenous and regional exposure to the
shock is a determinant factor for protest mobilization. This paper demonstrates that economic
shocks have a strong impact on fueling protest mobilization in competitive autocracies as
economic grievances become acute in the times of economic crisis, and chances of protest increase
with greater regional exposure to the shock.
Future research may further explore the effects of regional tax increases by distinguishing
between direct and indirect tax increases as well as incorporating the regional variation in the
magnitude of tax increases into the analysis. This would help to delve deeper into the exploration
of the effects of higher taxation on protest likelihood. Another avenue for future research lies with
exploring the scope of protests. The focus of this paper is concerned with exploring the effects of
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regional exposure to outside shocks on the frequency of protests. Therefore, the protests are treated
the same regardless of their size. However, investigating the effects of the same variables on the
scale of anti-government protest would shed the light on whether these effects are significant in
producing large-scale anti-government protests, which may have important implications for
democratization literature.
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ARTICLE 3: NATURAL DISASTERS AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HINDU-MUSLIM RIOTS IN INDIA

Introduction

Climate change has been a much disputed topic among policymakers in the past two decades.
Currently there is no consensus in policymaking and research communities whether climate
change directly contributes or triggers violent conflict. This paper aims to contribute to the debate
in the literature by examining the effects of climate-induced meteorological disasters on ethnic
riots in Indian states in the period of 1951-2015.
The effects of exogenous climate-related disasters such as floods and droughts on political
violence is a much disputed topic in the literature. Most studies stress the effects of disasterinduced economic and social variables such as resource scarcity, declines in agricultural output
and migration that induce the onset of violent conflict. Yet the existing empirical literature was
unsuccessful in identifying systematic and causal relationship between these events (Bernauer,
Boehmelt, & Koubi, 2012). Moreover, most research tends to categorize various forms of political
violence ranging from riots to civil war as civil conflict without distinguishing how climate-related
disasters may affect each particular type of violence. In fact, the effects of natural disasters may
be contingent on the type of civil conflict. The literature has established that conflict is more likely
when ethnic marginalization exists (Fjelde & Uexkull, 2012; Horowitz, 2001), and, therefore, the
natural disasters are more likely to increase chances of ethnic violence than other types of violence
if ethnic marginalization exists. Although there are some studies that examine the relationship
between disasters and low-scale communal conflict such as riots, the research that focuses
specifically on the effects of natural disasters on ethnic riots is very scarce (e.g. Slettebak, 2013).
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How do natural disasters such as floods affect the likelihood of ethnic riots? I argue that
floods caused by excess precipitation increase the likelihood of ethnic riots because (1) they result
in declined state capacity creating uncertainty about enforcement of existing ethnic contracts and
prevention of violence using police forces, (2) feelings of uncertainty create strong group
categorization, stereotyping and polarization increasing group tensions and chances of ethnic
violence. I posit that both of the proposed mechanisms may explain the positive effects of natural
disasters on ethnic violence. The literature has suggested that natural disasters put a strain on state
resources through decreased tax revenues and increased disaster management expenditures, and
weaken state capacity and its ability to provide enforcement of law (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl,
2002). A decreased state capacity also limits state’s ability to arbitrate between groups and enforce
ethnic contracts, which creates uncertainty and increases chances of ethnic conflict (Lake &
Rothchild, 1996). However, as Fearon & Laitin (2000) point out that people pay extravagant costs
when they engage in ethnic violence. Therefore, it is important to determine why people choose to
engage in costly conflict under the circumstances of uncertainty resulting from declined state
capacity following natural disasters. Here, I turn to social identity theories that provide important
insights to human behavior when they face uncertainty. The social identity mechanisms such as
strong group categorization and group conspiracy are activated in situations of distress and
uncertainty resulting from natural disasters. Strong in-group identification and blaming the outgroup are likely to raise hostilities and increase chances of ethnic violence. Investigating whether
and how the state capacity and social identity mechanisms contribute to ethnic riots in the
aftermath of natural disasters could reveal important implications for environmental security and
conflict literature in general. Recent research posits that group categorization is a cognitive process
(Hale, 2004); and “the ways in which ethnic – and non-ethnic – ways of seeing, interpreting, and

84

experiencing social relations are unselfconsciously “triggered” or activated by proximate
situational cues” (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004, p. 51). Furthermore, strong evidence
presented by prominent research in social identity theories shows that stronger group
identification, group stereotyping, and group conspiracy occur in situations of uncertainty such as
economic collapse or social unrest (Hogg & Mullin, 1999 as cited in Hale, 2004). In this paper, I
argue that natural disasters induced by meteorological factors result in declined state capacity and
limits state’s ability to arbitrate, prevent or stop violence as well as guarantee ethnic contracts
thereby creating situations of great uncertainty among ethnic groups that are likely to facilitate
stronger group identification along ethnic lines and group conspiracy that views the out-group as
a threat to its own survival. Under these conditions, groups are likely to reason that they have to
rely on their group as the state does not have the ability to protect them. This is likely to increase
animosity, tension and the likelihood of ethnic violence.
I test this argument by examining the link between climate-induced disasters caused by
precipitation and precipitation anomalies, and Hindu-Muslim riots in India at the state level in the
period of 1951-2015. Specifically, I aim to examine whether the likelihood of ethnic riots increases
in areas that have recently been affected by climate-induced meteorological disasters.
Ethnic riot is defined as “intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal
attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group, the
victims chosen because of their group membership” (Horowitz, 2001, p. 1). I use geo-referenced
climate data from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) to obtain average annual precipitation levels
and temperature in each state of India and the events data of violent conflicts in India from the
Center of Systemic Peace (CSP), Varshney and Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in
India, 1950-1995, and W-ICEWS (Worldwide Integrated Crisis Early Warning System).
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The Indian case is chosen for several reasons. First, India has experienced deadly ethnic
violence between Hindus and Muslims with tragic consequences for the most of its history making
it an intrinsically important case to study (Varshney, 2002). Second, over the last decade India has
been in the top five countries most frequently affected by natural disasters (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois,
& Below, 2014). Finally, India has poor economic infrastructure (Raghuvanshi, 2014), which
makes it more vulnerable to natural disaster effects.
The next section examines the literature that provides theoretical mechanisms and
empirical evidence supporting the above arguments. It also identifies the theoretical mechanisms
that are relevant for Hindu-Muslim riots in India and develops hypothesis on the link between
natural disasters and Hindu-Muslim riots. The section is followed by research design that outlines
variables, data, and methods used to test the hypotheses. The hypotheses are tested in the empirical
results section that delivers the results of the quantitative analysis followed by the discussion of
the findings and conclusion.

Literature Review

The largest set of literature focuses on resource scarcity as a mechanism linking disasters to
conflict. The proponents of the resource scarcity-induced conflict arguments posit that scarcity of
renewable resources such as water and arable land could lead to conflict in three different ways:
(1) competition over renewable resources; (2) “sons of the soil” conflicts, i.e. scarcity-induced
migration and competition over the resources in the receiving communities (Cote & Mitchell,
2015); and (3) variations in rainfall that undermines the economic activity in agricultural societies
(Fjelde & Uexkull, 2012). Under the first mechanism, the resource scarcity undermines the dayto-day livelihoods of the populations, and, therefore, produces competition for the resources,
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which may lead to violent conflicts as groups try to establish the equilibrium of resource
distribution (Homer-Dixon, 1994; 1999; Kahl, 2006). The most renowned proponent of this theory,
Homer-Dixon (1994) in his analysis of various case studies on environmental degradation finds
that environmental scarcity causes violence. He further argues that population growth and unequal
distribution of resources make the effect of scarcity on conflict more severe. Homer-Dixon & Blitt
(1998) posit that populations around the world depend on fresh water, forests, fisheries and
agricultural lands for their livelihoods, and, therefore, the scarcity of any of these key resources
could lead to violent conflict. Kahl (2002) supports this notion by stating that conflicts are likelier
to happen in developing countries that have limited capabilities in dealing with the issues of
scarcity. Although the resource-scarcity propositions provide interesting insights based on mostly
qualitative evidence, the results of large-N studies remain mixed and inconclusive (Bernauer,
Boehmelt, & Koubi, 2012). Most of these studies link water scarcity to low-scale conflict (Toset,
Gleditsch, & Hegre, 2000; Gleditsch et al., 2006; Gleick, 2014). Others find no strong support for
the resource scarcity and conflict relationship, but provide some evidence that land scarcity
combined with high population growth increases the likelihood of armed conflict (e.g. Urdal,
2005). Yet most of these studies focus on civil conflict in general only distinguishing between
large-scale interstate or civil war and low-scale communal conflict. The mixed and inconclusive
results of large-N studies may indicate that it is necessary to further parse out the effects of natural
disasters on different types of conflict including ethnic violence rather than civil conflict in general.
It is an important distinction to make in order to see whether competition over scarce resources is
more likely in multi-ethnic communities where political competition has ethnic characteristics.
However, even when these distinctions are made it is not clear why competition over scarce
resources would lead to violence rather than peaceful agreement of resource division. As Lake &
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Rothchild (1996) point out, violence is often misattributed to competition over scarce resources,
which alone is not sufficient to explain conflict, because violence is costly for all parties to conflict.
In the second scenario, the migration from the areas with dwindling resources to other areas
may cause conflict as the receiving communities may find themselves struggling to maintain the
previous level of access to resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Gleditsch, Nordas, & Salehyan, 2007;
Reuveny, 2007; Raleigh, 2010). In his 1999 study, Homer-Dixon outlines the second type of
mechanism through which scarcities lead to conflict. Limited agricultural and economic
productivity result in migration, poverty and grievances. These grievances cause violence if two
conditions are met: (1) there is a collective action based on religious, ethnic, or social class
identities (Habyarimana et al., 2007); (2) there is no peaceful alternative to expressing these
grievances (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Further, grievances and relative deprivation can be exploited by
political and community leaders who may create conflict between groups with different identities,
i.e. ethnic, religious etc. (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Reuveny (2007) posits that scarcity-induced
migration leads to competition over resources, ethnic tensions, distrust, socioeconomic fault lines,
which all may result in intrastate conflict in the migrant receiving areas. He further notes that
environmental migration is likelier to occur in lesser developed countries. Although these studies
provide an alternative mechanism in the form of migration, the arguments still center on resource
competition and scarcity. Yet again similar to the scarcity-induced conflict arguments, the
migration arguments do not explain why groups prefer to engage in conflict, which may be costly
in most contexts. The literature also does not delve into the question of whether these mechanisms
increase specific types of low-scale conflict and whether group differences between migrants and
receivers matter for conflict likelihood.
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Variation in rainfall is a third mechanism that was identified in the environmental literature
as the underlying cause of climate-induced conflicts (Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004; Fjelde
&.Uexkull, 2012; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). Fjelde & Uexkull (2012) provide one of the
strongest evidence in the literature of scarcity-induced conflicts by analyzing the link between
rainfall and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008. The authors find
that significant abnormalities in rainfall from the historical average increases the risk of communal
conflict. The risk is amplified in regions with politically marginalized ethnic groups (Fjelde &
Uexkull, 2012). The mechanisms leading to conflict include economic hardships and desperation
that makes a group to attack other communities in an effort to change the allocation of the scarce
resources (Fjelde & Uexkull, 2012). Rainfall variability may lead to drought-induced agricultural
shocks that result in income loss and lower the opportunity costs of joining insurgency thereby
increasing the risk of violent civil conflict (Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004; Wischnath &
Buhaug, 2014; Fjelde, 2015). Unlike resource-scarcity and migration centered studies, this strand
of research empirically examines the ethnic factor to find that the risk of conflict is higher in
ethnically marginalized regions. Yet they do not specifically investigate the effects of disasters on
one form ethnic violence, which is riots.
Some scholars have suggested that political and economic marginalization play a crucial
role in conflict onset while environmental scarcities can contribute to low-level conflict in
marginalized communities (Raleigh, 2010). Others posit that environmental scarcities may only
intensify existing conflicts (Barnett, 2001; Purvis & Busby, 2004). More recent research has
provided some evidence that drought and its duration are likely to increase civil conflict for
politically marginalized and agriculturally dependent groups (von Uexkul et al., 2016). Schleussler
et al. (2016) report that 23% of conflicts in ethnically fractionalized societies coincided with

89

climate-induced disasters in the period of 1980-2010. Yet again these studies do not provide the
mechanisms that link disasters to ethnic conflict.
Another interesting set of research centers on sociological aspects of disasters on the
affected communities providing alternative mechanisms to the traditional environmental
arguments discussed above. Slettebak (2012) provides a comprehensive review of this literature,
which argues that natural disasters can increase social cohesion in the affected communities
thereby decreasing the likelihood of violent conflict. The stronger social cohesion is attributed to
a common identity of disaster victims regardless of ethnic or class identities and increased sense
of unity in the face of adversity (Fritz, 1961; Durkheim, 1952 as cited in Slettebak, 2012). This
strand of research shows that identity is an important mechanism in conflict propensity. Yet these
studies focus on social cohesion ignoring the negative aspects of identity divisions resulting from
natural disasters in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Rich empirical evidence from social
identity theory studies has shown that events that produce uncertainty result in strong group
categorization, group stereotyping, and group conspiracy (Jetten, Hogg & Mullin, 2000; Reid &
Hogg, 2005). This suggests that identity may be divisive rather than cohesive meaning that under
conditions of uncertainty, people are more likely to show strong group identification along ethnic
lines through categorization and intergroup discrimination, and show hostility towards other ethnic
groups based on stereotyping. This is mainly used as a mechanism for uncertainty reduction (Hogg
& Adelman, 2013).
Ethnic conflict literature mainly links identity to ethnic violence through constructivist
explanations that merge themselves either with rationalist explanations or with discursive
approaches (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The former emphasizes the role of elites who manipulate
ethnic publics to incite violence (Woodward, 1995; Brass, 1997, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004).
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However, as Fearon and Laitin (2000) note, these studies do not systematically address why ethnic
publics follow. The discursive approach stresses the role of cultural discourses of ethnicity such
as symbols, myths, and narratives to explain eruption of ethnic violence (Geertz, 1973; Kapferer,
1988). This approach, despite being constructivist, has primordialist elements to it, because it treats
“ethnic discourses as unchanging essences that strongly determine individuals’ actions” (Fearon
and Laitin, 2000, p. 846). Based on these propositions and evidence from ethnic conflict literature,
it can be inferred that ethnic identity plays an important role in ethnic violence. However, the
question of how and why these ethnic identities are activated, which makes the public see and
interpret things in ethnic context and act violently against another ethnic group could be explored
from the perspectives offered by social identity theories. These theories propose that conditions of
uncertainty create strong in-group identification and favoritism and out-group hostility. The
uncertainty that arises from decreased state capacity in the form of law enforcement lowers state’s
ability to enforce ethnic contracts (Lake and Rothchild, 1996) and creates a security dilemma in
which groups compete for security and makes it more likely for an insecure group to act offensively
against the competing group (Posen, 1993). Natural disasters that result in decreased state capacity
and create uncertainty may activate ethnic identity mechanisms thereby making ethnic conflict
more likely. Therefore, engaging both ethnic conflict and social identity theories could shed light
on why and how people may engage in ethnic violence following natural disasters.

Hindu-Muslim violence
The exact causes of the Hindu-Muslim riots in India remain multifaceted. The most common
causes that have been suggested by social scientists include (1) primordial antagonism, i.e.
historical prejudices and hostilities between these religious groups that escalate trivial incidents
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into major riots; (2) spontaneous quarrels that turn into large riots as a result of rumors and
exaggeration of the preceding incidents (Brass, 2003). An alternative cause proposed by Brass
(2003) emphasizes the role of agents who ultimately decide whether a trivial incident gets
exaggerated and erupt into a riot based on the political calculations and interests of these agents.
Varshney (2002) argues against the primordial antagonism as an explanation of violence as riots
are endemic in certain Hindu-Muslim communities and absent in others. He posits that civil
society, specifically, organizations of interethnic and intercommunal engagement, play a crucial
role in preserving peace in interreligious urban settings.
Some scholars have challenged this notion of riots being spontaneous outbursts of
primordial hatred. Wilkinson (2004) explains the state and town level variation of Hindu-Muslim
violence by arguing that it is the electoral incentives that drive ethnic violence in India.
Specifically, he argues that "high levels of party competition lead to lower levels of antiminority
violence and that bipolar competition is generally associated with higher levels of violence" (p.
147). In highly fractionalized party systems, politicians have to rely on minority votes to win
elections or form coalitions and therefore, they will quell ethnic riots before they will become
violent. In contrast to bipolar competition the elite-dominated party politicians use anti-minority
rhetoric and polarization as a tactic to get the majority votes and sway the voters of their wider
ethnic category by using the anti-minority polarization. This argument is based on political
manipulation of voter identity with the goal of swaying the voters’ preferences using ethnic wedge.
There are some important insights that Wilkinson’s (2004) study provides. He tests
alternative explanations of subnational variability in Hindu-Muslim violence such as economic
division of labor, demographic balance – security dilemma, embittered refugees, and violencebegets-violence arguments and finds that all of these socio-economic variables are weak
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explanations of ethnic violence in India. His political manipulation arguments are, in contrast, are
fully supported in statistical models suggesting that electoral competition can both increase or
decrease ethnic violence depending on elite manipulation goals. Nonetheless, Wilkinson’s (2004)
argument makes two strong assumptions. First, riots are argued to be not spontaneous but
deliberately planned events resulting from elite manipulation. This assumption is in line with
Brass’s (2003) concept of “institutionalized riot system” based on elites’ inflammatory role in
riots. At the same time, it discounts Varshney’s (2002) argument of the role of civic engagement
in preventing riots. Second, the author takes a constructivist approach positing that voters have
many identities, and, therefore, those identities can be shifted by elites for electoral purpose. This
assumption supports earlier claims that ethnicity is multidimensional and thus manipulable
(Okamura, 1981), and that manipulation of identities is an important factor in ethnic politics
(Okamura, 1981; Nagel, 1994; Brass, 1991, 1997). However, it should be noted that there is not
enough empirical evidence for this argument in the literature, and the role of political entrepreneurs
in igniting ethnic violence is often exaggerated (Lake & Rothchild, 1996).
Furthermore, both of Wilkinson’s (2004) assumptions are downplayed by cognitive models
in social identity theories, which posit that cognition is “unselfconscious and quasi-automatic
rather than deliberate and controlled”, and, therefore, “the explicit, deliberate, and calculated
deployment of an ethnic frame in pursuit of instrumental advantage may be less important, in
explaining the situational variability of ethnicity” (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004, p. 51).
Instead, the authors argue, more attention should be paid to why people use ethnic interpretive
scheme, a cognitive process that is activated by situational cues. Cognitive models do not reject
the idea that deliberate manipulation by political entrepreneurs may occur, but the questions of
why people decide to follow the political entrepreneurs that incite ethnic violence and why people
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see, interpret, and act in ethnic rather than non-ethnic context remain open. Cognitive models
suggest that categorization is a mental process through which our brain structures, sorts, and orders
everything we see, hear, think, and experience. This allows for making sense of the world by
processing the massive amount information with minimal effort. Social categorization occurs as a
result of cognitive construction, which in itself, is a social construction formed by knowledge and
culture. Social categorization, stereotyping in particular, is also an automatic and unselfconscious
process that is activated by situational triggers, which are based on past recurrent events and/or
social experience. Therefore, race and ethnicity are not things but perspectives on the world based
on our perceptions and shaped by our social experiences, which suggests that race and ethnicity
are our subjective perceptions. The way we choose to see something in ethnic or non-ethnic
contexts depends on our unique perspectives, which makes manipulation by political entrepreneurs
difficult unless their framing can activate and trigger certain cues in our cognition that makes us
see and interpret things in an ethnic context.
The empirical work of whether specifically climate-related natural disasters increase the
likelihood of riots and politically motivated violence in Indian states in the period of 1956-2002
was studied by Slettebak (2013). His findings indicate that natural disasters can affect the
likelihood of conflict under certain conditions. Natural disasters increase the likelihood of riots at
higher levels of literacy, and floods are found to be more linked to riots at higher levels of literacy
than other disaster types. The attempted analysis of this paper is different from the Slettebak’s
analysis in several ways. First, Slettebak (2013) examines all reported riot incidents, while this
paper focuses specifically on Hindu-Muslim riots, which allows to distinguish ethnic violence
from other types of political violence and test the effects of natural disasters on inter-group
violence using identity categorization as a mechanism. Second, Slettebak’s (2013) measure of

94

natural disaster includes droughts, storms, floods, extreme temperatures, wildfires, and
precipitation-induced landslides that resulted in “ten or more people reported killed, hundred or
more reported affected, a declaration of state of emergency, or a call for international assistance”
(p. 268). This paper focuses on meteorological disasters caused by precipitation and temperature
anomalies as these disasters are truly exogenous whereas wildfires and landslides can be manmade.

Theory and Hypotheses

Natural disasters such as floods and droughts disrupt the lives of people by causing damage,
suffering, and uncertainty. The immediate effects may include death, damage of infrastructure,
crop failure, and disruption of public goods delivery. Political science scholars suggest that state
capacity is important as it determines the state control of violence, repression, and the likelihood
of civil conflict and regime survival (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Fearon & Laitin,
2003). The existing research posits that natural disasters decrease state capacity and its ability to
provide enforcement of law because of decreased tax revenues and increased disaster management
expenditures (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2002). Disasters in the form of floods may also destroy
or damage the infrastructure hindering state’s ability to effectively deploy the military and law
enforcement forces to the affected areas where violence may arise. In the conditions of damage
and disruption of public goods delivery following natural disasters, law enforcement becomes
crucial in sustaining order. In the absence of sufficient levels of law enforcement, the chaos and
anarchy may prevail and result in communal violence. Law enforcement is a serious deterrent force
in preventing riots as people are generally unwilling to oppose the military and law enforcement
forces regardless of the strength of the motivations to engage in violence (Horowitz, 2001).
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Therefore, it is logical to assume that the chances of ethnic riots increase as the ability of state to
sustain order using military and law enforcement decreases in the aftermath of natural disaster
events. Moreover, as evidence of ethnic violence from around the world shows, the chances of
looting the property of the minority significantly increases when there is a little risk of being
confronted by police, and, specifically in India, deployment of police determines whether violence
breaks out or not (Wilkinson, 2004). However, if law enforcement is necessary in preventing ethnic
violence from breaking out, the question of why the ethnic violence breaks out in the first place
should be addressed. Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue that decreased state capacity lowers state’s
ability to enforce ethnic contracts, to mediate between groups in resolving differences, and to
provide protection for minorities. This raises collective fears of the future and create a security
dilemma. People suddenly find themselves responsible for their own security in the absence of a
strong state, which creates competition for security among groups (Posen, 1993). Furthermore,
according to Posen (1993), an insecure group will prefer offensive strategy against a competing
group, which increases chances of ethnic conflict. The aftermath of natural disasters often creates
anarchy when a state is not able to maintain law and order in the affected communities. Ethnic
groups may have increased concerns for their security preferring to engage in violence against
another group to obtain more security. However, ethnic conflict inflicts extravagant costs on the
participants (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). What makes a group to overcome the cost dilemma to
engage in violence when state capacity declines as a result of natural disasters? I turn to social
identity theories to answer this question. Empirical evidence from this social identity research
indicates that events that produce uncertainty lead to strong group categorization, group
stereotyping, and group conspiracy (Hale, 2004). Before I turn to explaining the role of this
mechanism in producing conflict, I provide a cursory overview of the concept of group
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categorization. Tajfel and Turner (1979) find that people categorize themselves and others in
specific social groups. Once they place themselves in a category to which they belong, they
identify in-group (us) members, who they view positively, and out-group (them) members, who
they view negatively. The categorization occurs on various grounds such as religious affiliation,
ethnicity, race, gender and others. Strong group identification results in in-group favoritism,
distrust of out-group members, and preference for centralized group leadership (Tajfel, 1982;
Forsyth, 1999). Brewer (1999) argues that in-group preference serves as a basis for out-group hate,
which is fostered by perceived threat by the in-group that sees the out-group as dangerous for their
interests or survival.
I argue that uncertainty created by natural disasters results in strong group identification.
The strong group categorization allows people to reduce feelings of uncertainty; and uncertainty
reduction is a precondition for fulfillment of major human aspirations such as survival (Hale,
2004). Furthermore, uncertainty reduction is one of the main individual-level motivations that lies
at the core of intergroup behavior, and circumstantial uncertainty can be reduced by group
affiliation and group action (Hogg, 2000; Reid & Hogg, 2005). Therefore, when affected by natural
disasters people strive to reduce uncertainty through self-categorization and group membership in
order to realize their motivation for survival. High levels of uncertainty are shown to increase
identification with groups that are pertinent to reducing uncertainty (Reid & Hogg, 2005). As Hogg
& Adelman (2013) put it “when, for example, people feel their security, prosperity, and lifestyle
are threatened,…they yearn to identify strongly with a group that can actually get things done to
remove or buffer the threat—a radical group that has a forceful behavioral agenda” (p. 441). The
higher the level of uncertainty, the more likely are the people to identify with homogenous groups;
and “groups are homogenous when there is marked similarity among members” (Jetten, Hogg, &
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Mullin, 2000, p.187). Social categorization may occur based different group similarities including
ethnicity, gender, economic class etc. Ethnicity is the one of the most common and basic ways of
social identity categorization, especially in countries like India where social polarization leading
to violence often occurs on ethnic grounds, i.e. Hindu-Muslim. Most scholarship in political
science follows Weber (1978) in defining ethnicity as personal “perceptions of common descent,
history, fate, and culture, which usually indicates some mix of language, physical appearance, and
the ritual regulation of life, especially religion” (Hale, 2004). Because natural disasters produce
high levels of uncertainty, we can expect an increased group identification among affected people
who are likely to identify highly with their ethnic group. They are also more likely to favor and
join in-groups that engage in extremist or radical behavior against out-groups that they view as
dangerous for their interests or survival.
It is important to note that both self-categorization and stereotyping are cognitive
processes, and cognitive models of social identity theory suggest that they occur unconsciously
and effortlessly because both are automatic mental processes by which our brain processes and
makes sense of the world (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004). Categories represent the
collection of memories, people, myths, and discourses, and they are activated through situational
cues (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004). Furthermore, Lake and Rothchild (1996) argue that
ethnic polarization is amplified by “political memories and myths and emotions” thereby
increasing chances of ethnic rivalry and violence (p. 56). I argue that high levels of uncertainty in
the aftermath of natural disasters activate cognitive social categorization and stereotyping of
ethnicity and strong in-group identification in the effort to reduce uncertainty. However, social
categorization and stereotyping do not need to lead to communal violence. The violence occurs in
the context of the security dilemma arising from natural disaster induced uncertainty caused by the
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lack or decreased capacity of the state to enforce ethnic contracts. Categorization and stereotyping
explain why violence is likely to take on the ethnic context.
In sum, I contend that decreased state capacity in the aftermath of natural disasters results
in the absence of sufficient levels of law enforcement, which increases the chances of communal
conflict. The communal conflict is likely to be along ethnic lines because (1) lowered state capacity
from natural disasters decreases enforcement of ethnic contracts and provision of protection for
minorities creating the security dilemma for ethnic groups, (2) uncertainty created by natural
disasters results in strong ethnic group identification and makes people more likely to join ingroups that engage in extremist or radical behavior against out-groups.
Based on these arguments and evidence above, I theorize that decreased state capacity,
increased group categorization, and security dilemma resulting from disaster-induced uncertainty
are likely to result in ethnic riots.
H1: Natural disasters in the form of precipitation and temperature anomalies increase the
likelihood of ethnic riots in the affected areas.
Although natural disasters are expected to have a significant effect on ethnic violence, there
are socioeconomic and political factors that can arguably produce ethnic violence or moderate the
effects of other variables on such violence. The importance of these factors may be especially
relevant in countries such as India where the issues of poverty and political manipulation are
prevalent. The literature has long argued that socioeconomic inequality and poverty produce civil
conflict and political violence (Gurr, 1970; Berkowitz, 1972; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998, 2004;
Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Some scholars have specifically linked economic conditions to ethnic
riots. Bohlken & Sergenti (2010) find that economic growth has a significant effect on decreasing
Hindu-Muslim violence in India. The authors contend that there are three potential mechanisms

99

that link slow economic growth to ethnic violence. First, party leaders may try to distract voters’
attention from economic problems by emphasizing the salience of ethnic issues. Second, economic
problems increase ethnic competition thereby increasing chances of violence. Third, the
opportunity costs of engaging in riot is higher when economic conditions are favorable.
The economic deprivation may increase feelings of marginalization in disaster-affected
regions thereby increasing chances of communal violence (Fjelde & Ostby, 2010 as cited in Fielde
& Uexkull, 2012). The areas where poverty is widespread may be more susceptible to ethnic
violence in the aftermath of natural disasters, and, therefore, the effect of natural disasters on ethnic
violence may be conditional on economic conditions of the given region. Poor regions may
experience more incidents of communal violence when hit by disastrous climatic anomalies than
the wealthier ones. If this argument is correct, we would expect to find evidence for the following
hypothesis.
H2: Natural disasters in the form of precipitation and temperature anomalies increase the
likelihood of ethnic riots conditional on poverty levels in the affected areas.
Another important factor that could moderate the effect of natural disasters on ethnic riots
in India is electoral manipulation by elite-dominated parties. Electoral manipulation using ethnic
wedge is commonplace in India, and the Hindu party leaders’ rhetoric is known to incite violence
against minorities (Wilkinson, 2004). Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is a Hindu nationalist party.
BJP was founded in 1980 and after 1998 elections it led a coalition known as the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA), which was in power until 2004. The NDA suffered a defeat in 2004
elections, however, BJP steadily gained ground in the majority of Indian states over the next
decade until its landslide victory in the national legislative elections in 2014. Although the party
leaders and prominent members had been accused of religious prejudice and inciting violence, the
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party was able to draw support from lower castes and even Muslim communities in the 2014
elections through the promises of economic opportunities and restoration of cultural sites.
However, the traditional supporters of the party are the Hindu and upper-caste voters. The areas
with large support for Hindu nationalist policies are likely to be more prone to backlash against
minorities if such communities exist. Therefore, I expect the effect of natural disasters on ethnic
violence to be more pronounced in areas with large support for the Hindu nationalist parties,
specifically BJP.
H3: Natural disasters in the form of precipitation and temperature anomalies increase the
likelihood of ethnic riots conditional on high electoral support of Hindu nationalist parties in the
affected areas.

Research Design
Fixed effects Poisson regression models are used to test the hypotheses. Year and state fixed effects
are used, and standard errors are clustered by state. The empirical analysis consists of two parts.
The first part focuses on the effects of precipitation and temperature anomalies on ethnic riots. The
research design of this analysis does not use control variables because rainfall and temperature are
as good as random in fixed effects models at the subnational level; control variables would be
endogenous if they can be affected by climate factors (Hsiang, 2016). Therefore, using standard
control variables for ethnic conflict such as population, poverty and electoral dynamics would bias
the results.
The second part of the empirical analysis tests the effect of precipitation and temperature
anomalies on ethnic riot conditional on economic and political factors, i.e. poverty and electoral
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support for Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party. The models that test the
effects conditional on poverty, the electoral support for BJP is used as a control variable whereas
the models that use BJP support in the interaction term use poverty as a control variable.

Sample and Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is state year, where the values are recorded for dependent and independent
variables in a given year. The first part of the empirical analysis uses the period of 1951-2015. The
second part of the analysis focuses on the period of 1984-2005. The periods were determined based
on the availability of data across all variables.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the number of ethnic riots operationalized as the count variable of riots
in each state per annum. The data for the dependent variable come from three sources: (1) India
Sub-National Problem Set, 1960-2004, which is the events data of violent conflicts in India from
the Center of Systemic Peace (CSP) compiled from the Keesings Record of World Events, (2)
Varshney and Wilkinson Dataset on Hindu-Muslim Violence in India, 1950-1995, and (3) ICEWS
Coded Event Data from W-ICEWS (Worldwide Integrated Crisis Early Warning System)18, an
event dataset with data from news reports around the world coded using the BBN ACCENT event
coder. The data from the CSP and ICEWS include all types of violent conflicts, and, therefore, I
filter out the spontaneous ethnic violent events by excluding the following actors: government,
rebel, insurgent and terrorist organizations as the involvement of these actors violates the condition

18

The data is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews. W-ICEWS v.10 (1995-2015 was used for
this paper.
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of spontaneity of a conflict event such as riot. I then include a condition of an involvement of an
ethnic actor (e.g. Hindu, Muslim, ethnic, religious) either as a source actor or a target actor.

Independent Variable
The independent variable is natural disaster operationalized as the anomalies in precipitation and
temperature in each analyzed state of India. The anomalies are annual deviations from the mean
precipitation and temperature in each state in the analyzed period. The data come from the CRU
TS v. 4.00 gridded time series data set (1901-2015)19 that contains geo-referenced data on global
monthly precipitation levels (includes all land areas excluding Antarctica at 0.5° resolution) and
temperature.
The data set is provided by the Climate Research Unit (CRU). The CRU TS v. 4.00 dataset
includes the following variables: mean temperature (TMP), diurnal temperature range,
precipitation, vapor pressure, cloud cover and wet-day frequency. The data for each of these
variables are provided in separate files in NetCDF format. The data for Climatic Research Unit
(CRU) monthly climate archives come from the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in
collaboration with the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, via
its National Climatic Data Center, NCDC) (Harris et al., 2014). CRU accesses this information
through the Met Office Hadley Centre in the UK and NCDC in the USA (Harris et al., 2014). I
process these data using ArcGIS software to produce zonal statistics on average precipitation and
temperature in Indian districts in the period of 1951-2015.20

19

The dataset is available through CRU website https://crudata.uea.ac.uk/cru/data/hrg/

20

I excluded 1950 from the analysis because the NetCDF climate file for that year is corrupted and I was not able to
download it from the CRU website.
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Interaction and control variables
The first interaction variable is poverty level in each observed state. The poverty data comes from
the Government of India Planning Commission 2014 report21. The data is obtained for the period
of 1984-2005 using Lakdawala calculation method for poverty line. India started using the
Tendulkar methodology for calculating poverty line after 2005. The data after 2005 is, therefore,
different from the previous periods, which is likely to cause inconsistencies in the analysis.
Therefore, the analysis includes only the periods before 2005 that uses the Lakdawala
methodology.
The second interaction variable is the electoral support for Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) by
state. The BJP support serves as a measure of support for Hindu nationalist policies and leaders,
some of which have allegedly incited communal violence against minorities. The data is obtained
for the period of 1984-2005 from the Election Commission of India22.
Both variables serve as control variables in models in which they are not used as interaction
variables.

21

The report is available on the Planning Commission website
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/pov_rep0707.pdf

22

The data is available on the Election Commission of India website https://eci.gov.in/statistical-report/statisticalreports/
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Empirical Results

I present the results of the regression that test the effects of natural disasters on ethnic riots in Table
3-1. As the results show, positive deviation from the norm in precipitation and temperature levels
have significant effects on ethnic riots in Models 1 and 2 suggesting that natural disasters in the
form of floods or droughts increase the likelihood of ethnic violence in India. Model 2 uses the
interaction term of temperature and precipitation anomalies in order to test the marginal effect of
precipitation anomaly on ethnic riots. The interaction term and the individual effects of anomalous
precipitation and temperature on Hindu-Muslim riots are statistically significant (p<.01).

Table 3-1. Effects of natural disasters on ethnic riots in India, 1951-2015
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Temperature anomaly

.361**
(.137)

.344*
(.141)

Precipitation anomaly

.004*
(.002)

.013**
(.004)

Temperature*precipitation anomaly

-.017**
(.004)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
by state. **p< .01; *p< .05. Obs=2,210.

The interaction effects from Model 2 can be best observed in Figure 1 that shows the
marginal effects of precipitation anomalies on the onset of ethnic riots. As can be seen on the
graph, the effects of floods on the likelihood of ethnic riot increase as temperatures go up, and the
effects are more positive during the periods of anomalously high temperatures.
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Figure 3-1. Average Marginal Effects of Precipitation Anomaly on Ethnic Riot

Next, I examine the effects of the absolute values of precipitation and temperature
deviations from the norm, which allows to see the net effects of anomalies on riots. I present the
results in Table 3-2 that shows that absolute deviations of precipitation from the norm increase the
likelihood of ethnic riots (p<.01). Furthermore, the marginal effect of absolute deviations of
precipitation on riots is also statistically significant (p<.01) further confirming the results from
Table 3-1. Temperature anomaly, however, is only significant in Model 1 suggesting that absolute
deviations in temperature increase chances of ethnic conflict (p<.01).
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Table 3-2. Effects of absolute deviations of precipitation and temperature on ethnic riots in India,
1951-2015
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Temperature anomaly

-.251**
(.077)

.269
(.202)

Precipitation anomaly

.029**
(.009)

.042**
(.013)

Temperature*precipitation anomalies

-.020**
(.006 )

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
by state. **p< .01; *p< .05. Obs=2,210.
The marginal effect of absolute precipitation anomaly is illustrated in Figure 3-2. The graph
shows that the effects of absolute anomalous precipitation on chances of ethnic riot increase at
more anomalous temperatures whether positive or negative. This suggests that the marginal effect
of any deviation from the norm in precipitation levels positively affect chances of ethnic riot at
more anomalous temperatures.
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Figure 3-2. Average Marginal Effects of Absolute Precipitation Anomaly on Ethnic Riot

Finally, I run a set of regressions to analyze the effects of temperature and precipitation
rather than their anomalies on ethnic riots. This approach allows to see whether increases in
temperature or precipitation that are not necessarily anomalous can have an effect on ethnic riots.
The results presented in Model 1 in Table 3-3 show that higher precipitation and temperature levels
have positive effects on chances of ethnic riots. This is consistent with the results of the effects of
temperature and precipitation anomalies on ethnic riots suggesting that increases in these variables
have significant effects on ethnic riots. The interaction of temperature and precipitation in Model
2 is not statistically significant, but the individual effects of higher precipitation and temperature
are shown to be powerful predictors of ethnic riots.
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Table 3-3. Effects of precipitation and temperature on ethnic riots in India, 1951-2015
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Temperature

.361**
(.137)

.368**
(.139)

Precipitation

.005*
(.002)

.005**
(.002)

Temperature*precipitation

-.0003
(.0004)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
by state. **p< .01; *p< .05. Obs=2,210.
Overall, the results demonstrate that natural disasters in the form of meteorological
anomalies, i.e. floods and droughts, and higher precipitation and temperature levels are strong
predictors of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, which provides significant support to the hypothesis
that natural disasters increase the likelihood of ethnic riots.
It should be noted that the analysis was done at the state level, and the district level analysis
may reveal different results. However, the district level analysis would limit the ability to perform
the second part of the empirical analysis that makes the effect of natural disasters conditional on
support for nationalist parties and poverty. The data for electoral support and poverty are not
readily available at the district level, which is why the state level analysis is most appropriate for
conducting the comprehensive study.
The second part of the empirical analysis makes the effect of natural disasters conditional on
socioeconomic and political factors such as poverty and support for Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), the Hindu nationalist party. Table 3-4 presents the results of models in which precipitation
anomalies are interacted with poverty in Model 1 and BJP support in Model 2. The results in
Model 2 show that interaction effect of precipitation anomaly and BJP support is statistically
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significant and the individual effect of precipitation anomaly on ethnic riot is positive. The
interaction effect can be best observed in Figure 3-3, which shows that the effect of precipitation
anomaly on ethnic riot decreases at higher levels of vote share for BJP. This finding suggests that
areas with high levels of support for Hindu nationalist policies are less likely to experience
ethnic riots following floods than those with smaller BJP vote share. These results are contrary to
H3 that expects natural disasters to increase the likelihood of ethnic riots conditional on high
electoral support of Hindu nationalist parties in the affected areas. The finding may seem
counter-intuitive, but it is not illogical. It may indicate that areas with large support for Hindu
nationalist policies are inhabited by mostly Hindu population with no or small presence of
Muslim communities decreasing the chances of communal violence. Poverty levels, on the other
hand, are shown not to affect chances of ethnic riots independently or when interacted with
precipitation anomalies as can be seen in Model 1.
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Table 3-4. Predicting Ethnic Riots with Precipitation Anomalies Conditional on Poverty and BJP
Support, 1984-2005

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Precipitation

.002
(.005)

.037**
(.013)

Poverty

-.150
(.126)

-.128
(.116)

Precipitation*poverty

.001
(.0004)

BJP support

.040
(.047)

.033
(.044)

Precipitation*BJP support

-.001*
(.001)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. State and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
by state. **p< .01; *p< .05. Obs=635.
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Figure 3-3. Average Marginal Effects of Precipitation Anomaly on Ethnic Riot

Next, I interact the temperature anomalies with poverty and BJP support variables and
present the results in Table 3-5. Model 1 yields no statistically significant results suggesting that
temperature anomalies conditional on poverty levels are not likely to affect chances of ethnic riots.
Model 2 shows that temperature anomalies have a positive effect on ethnic riot, however,
interacting temperature anomalies with BJP support does not yield any significant results. Similar
to the results in Table 3-4, poverty levels do not produce significant effects on ethnic riots nor does
the interaction term between the temperature anomalies and poverty levels as can be seen in Model
1.
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Table 3-5. Predicting Ethnic Riots with Temperature Anomalies Conditional on Poverty and BJP
Support, 1984-2005
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Temperature

.948
(.580)

.378**
(.074)

Poverty

-.082
(.104)

-.147
(.110)

Temperature*Poverty

.029
(.021)

BJP support

.037
(.041)

.040
(.045)

Temperature*BJP support

-.010
(.006)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by state. **p< .01; *p< .05.
Obs=635.

In sum, the empirical evidence presented in this article suggests that natural disasters
measured as precipitation and temperature anomalies have a positive effect on ethnic riots.
Excess precipitation anomalies and abnormally high temperatures increase chances of ethnic
riots suggesting that floods and droughts can be powerful predictors of ethnic conflict. The
marginal effect of floods on riots is shown to increase at abnormally high temperatures. The
absolute deviations from the norm in precipitation and temperature are also shown to increase
chances of ethnic riots, and the effects of absolute anomalous precipitation on ethnic riot are
higher at more anomalous temperatures whether positive or negative. Furthermore, the support
for nationalist parties is shown to moderate the effects of floods on ethnic riots while poverty
levels do not produce any significant independent or moderating effects on violence.
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Conclusion

This paper examined the link between natural disasters in the form of floods and ethnic violence
by exploring Hindu-Muslim riots in India. The findings provide strong empirical evidence that
natural disasters in the form of precipitation and temperature anomalies increase the likelihood of
ethnic riots. These findings contribute to the environmental security literature that links natural
disasters to civil conflict by showing that floods and droughts are strong predictors of HinduMuslim violence in Indian states. Moreover, the effect of floods on ethnic riots is shown to be
higher at anomalously high temperatures suggesting that climate change and global warming
may increase chances of ethnic violence.
Explaining ethnic riots in India presents a challenge as the causal factors are diverse and
there is no consensus on causality of ethnic violence. This paper offers an alternative perspective
to existing theories about Hindu-Muslim violence in India by proposing that natural disasters
decrease state capacity thereby lowering state guarantees of ethnic contract and minority
protection. They also activate feelings of uncertainty resulting in strong group identification with
their ethnicity and stereotyping of the out-group ethnicity. Ethnic conflict results from security
dilemma in the conditions of anarchy when groups view the rival group as a threat to their security
and choose to rely on their in-group to reduce uncertainty, obtain or increase security, and survive.
Further, the results of the analysis involving poverty levels and support for Hindu
nationalist policies suggest that the effect of precipitation anomalies conditional on support for
Hindu nationalist policies decreases at higher levels of support for Hindu nationalist policies
whereas the same effect is not observed when precipitation and temperature anomalies are
interacted with poverty levels.
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The study contributes to the extant environmental security and ethnic conflict literatures
by showing that climactic factors are capable of increasing chances of ethnic conflict. This is
particularly important, because existing studies explore the effects of natural disasters on civil
conflict in general without examining the effects on ethnic conflict, which is often driven by
distinct factors that involve identity. Another important facet of the findings in this paper is its
implications for the contemporary debates on the effects of climate change. It shows that the effects
of climate change that result in meteorological anomalies are capable of contributing to higher
frequencies of violence and deaths. Therefore, combating climate change is an important task for
policymakers in maintaining stability, peace, and security.
One of the questions that remains to be explored is whether meteorological anomalies are
unique in having positive effects on ethnic riot. One can argue that other types of natural disasters,
i.e. earthquakes, landslides etc. could also result in decreased state capacity, increased uncertainty
and propensity for conflict among ethnic groups. The future research could explore this question
to see whether the effects are specific to climatic factors.
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CONCLUSION
The empirical analysis in the three studies of this dissertation reveal diverse and interesting
findings. Both positive and negative price shocks have significant effects on protest mobilization
in rentier autocracies and hybrid regimes when conditioned by repressive capacity and taxation.
Specifically, in rentier autocracies higher resource rents or net oil exports decrease protest
likelihood when conditioned by stronger repressive capacity. In rentier hybrid regimes, increases
in net oil exports have a positive effect on protest conditional on higher repressive capacity.
Furthermore, in rentier hybrid regimes, the anti-government protest is also more likely when
resource rents are higher conditional on lower taxation. The findings for hybrid regimes resonate
with modernization and democratization literature arguments that attribute protest mobilization to
higher economic development, which gives rise to the middle class with its demands for
democratization.
The subnational analysis of anti-government protest in Russia, a rentier competitive
autocracy, showed that the regional exposure to economic shocks in the form of unemployment
and lower mining employment increases have shown to be strong predictors of regional protest.
The results remain robust across several models and suggest that regional exposure to shocks does
play an important role in the likelihood of protest. This empirical evidence indicates the importance
of regional economic conditions resulting from exogenous shocks on protest mobilization in
rentier competitive autocracies. There are important inferences for contentious politics as well as
rentier state literatures that can be taken away from these empirical results. The extant literature
has not paid attention on the effects of economic shocks on the subnational variation of antigovernment protest. As the empirical results of this study have demonstrated, regional economic
conditions affected by external shocks can have significant effects on local anti-government
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protests, which potentially could challenge the national government if protests erupt across several
regions. This has important implications for both rentier state and democratization literatures. Of
course, the scale of these protests would also play a crucial role, and future studies could explore
how exogenous economic shocks affect the scale of regional protests. Moreover, the positive
effects of higher education on protest has further implications for democratization literature by
showing that middle class can serve as the force for democratization in hybrid regimes. This
finding further reinforces the findings of the cross-national analysis where more wealth is
associated with protest in hybrid regimes, which can possibly be attributed to the rise of middle
class. The importance of higher resource rents and the expansion of middle class in protest
mobilization is especially high in hybrid regimes.
Finally, the empirical analysis of natural disasters in the form of floods and Hindu-Muslim
riots in India provides statistically significant evidence of this relationship suggesting that
meteorological disasters in the form of excess precipitation increase chances of ethnic riots and
that areas with higher vote share for Hindu nationalist parties are less likely to experience ethnic
riots as a result of meteorological anomalies in the form of excess precipitation than those with
smaller nationalist vote share. The paper contributes to the latest environmental security and
conflict literatures as well as contemporary debates on climate change and provides some
suggestions for future research that includes exploring the effects of other types of natural disasters
on ethnic conflict.
The avenues for further research should include examining the effects of regional direct
and indirect tax increases and including the size of regional tax increases into the analysis. Doing
so would allow to observe effects of higher taxation on protest likelihood more precisely.
Exploring the effects of commodity shocks on the scope of regional protests is another interesting
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avenue that should be considered. Expanding the analysis to investigate the effects on the scale of
anti-government protest would help better understand whether the commodity price shocks could
seriously threaten regime stability in hybrid regimes.
As far as ethnic conflict concerned, future studies should examine the effects of nonmeteorological disasters such as earthquakes and landslides on communal violence. It is reasonable
to expect that these calamities should also hinder state capacity, increase uncertainty and chances
of ethnic conflict. The results of that research could shed light on whether the effects are specific
to meteorological events. This is especially important in the light of the contemporary debates on
the devastative effects of climate change on conflict and the future of human livelihood.
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APPENDIX A: POLITICAL TERROR SCALE LEVELS23

23

The table is from Political Terror Scale coding rules http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/Documentation.html
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Score Interpretation
1

Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and
torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

2

There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However,
few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

3

There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment.
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention,
with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

4

Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population.
Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality,
on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

5

Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no
limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological
goals.
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APPENDIX B: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP CONDITIONAL TO REPRESSIVE
CAPACITY IN RENTIER DEMOCRACIES, 1995-2014
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents X Repressive capacity

.016

Model 2

(.01)
Resource rents

.095**
(.03)

Repression

-.903**

.584

(.30)

(.30)

Net oil exports as % of GDP X Repressive

.113

capacity

(.07)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

. 058
(.24)

Stabilization Fund

.344

.804**

(.29)

(.31)

.0001

.0001

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

159

143

Pseudo R2

0.7213

0.7554

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX C: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP CONDITIONAL TO TAX INCREASES IN
RENTIER AUTOCRACIES, 1995-2014
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents t-1 X Taxes/GDP

.004

Model 2

(.002)
Resource rents t-1

-.050
(.04)

Oil exports as % of GDP

t-1

X Taxes/GDP

-.106
(.35)

Oil exports as % of GDP

-4.77

t-1

(3.52)
Taxes/GDP

-.058

.219

(.14)

(.28)

-2.629

-1.969

(8.34)

(17.04)

.0001**

-.0001**

(.00002)

(.00002)

N

96

90

Pseudo R2

0.8709

0.8739

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX D: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP CONDITIONAL TO REPRESSIVE
CAPACITY IN RENTIER HYRID REGIMES, 1995-2014 (AT 3%
THRESHOLD FOR RESOURCE RENTS)
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents X Repressive capacity

.002

Model 224

(.01)
Resource rents

.001
(.03)

Repressive capacity

-.468*
(.23)

Net oil exports as % of GDP X Repressive
capacity
Net oil exports as % of GDP
Stabilization Fund

.151
(.54)

GDP per capita

-.00003
(.00004)

N

663

Pseudo R2

0.7930

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Standard errors are clustered by
country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.

24

The statistical results did not converge.
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APPENDIX E: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP CONDITIONAL TO REPRESSIVE
CAPACITY IN RENTIER AUTOCRACIES, 1995-2014 (AT 3%
THRESHOLD FOR RESOURCE RENTS)
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents X Repression

.042*

Model 2

(.02)
Resource rents

-.144*
(.07)

Repressive capacity

-1.572**

-.999**

(.40)

(.26)

Net oil exports as % of GDP X Repressive

2.701*

capacity

(1.06)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

-16.627**
(4.76)

Stabilization Fund

.779

1.106**

(.40)

(.35)

.0001*

.0001**

(.0001)

(.00005)

N

383

337

Pseudo R2

0.7764

0.7797

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Standard errors are clustered by
country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX F: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP CONDITIONAL TO REPRESSIVE
CAPACITY IN RENTIER DEMOCRACIES, 1995-2014 (AT 3%
THRESHOLD FOR RESOURCE RENTS)
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents t-1 X Taxes/GDP

.002

Model 2

(.003)
Resource rents t-1

.005
(.07)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

t-1

X Taxes/GDP

-.068
(.07)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

6.014

t-1

(5.94)
Taxes/GDP

.040

.063

(.08)

(.06)

.530**

.689**

(.19)

(.17)

-1.90e-06

1.93e-06

(.00001)

(.00001)

N

346

335

Pseudo R2

0.6037

0.6192

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Standard errors are clustered by
country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX G: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH RESOURCE RENTS AND NET
OIL EXPORTS AS % OF GDP, AND TAXES AS % OF GDP IN RENTIER
HYBRID REGIMES, 1995-2014 (AT 3% THRESHOLD FOR RESOURCE
RENTS)
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Variables

Model 1

Resource rents t-1 X Taxes/GDP

-.003

Model 2

(.002)
Resource rents t-1

.074*
(.04)

Net oil exports as % of GDP

t-1

X

-.071

Taxes/GDP
Net oil exports as % of GDP

(.08)
5.648**

t-1

(1.84)
Taxes/GDP

.040

-.019

(.07)

(.05)

-.305

-.117

(.80)

(.72)

-.0002*

-.0001

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

314

285

Pseudo R2

0.8355

0.8276

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Standard errors are clustered by
country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX H: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH OIL PRICES CONDITIONAL
TO REPRESSIVE CAPACITY IN RENTIER HYBRID REGIME STATES
AND RENTIER AUTOCRACIES, 1995-2014
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Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Hybrid Regimes

Autocracies

.006

-.010

(.005)

(.01)

.0005

.017

(.02)

(.04)

-.017

1.245

(.37)

(.68)

-.521

3.576**

(.45)

(1.21)

.00001

.0002

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

343

231

Pseudo R2

0.6694

0.4735

Oil prices X Repressive capacity

Oil prices

Repressive capacity

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX I: PREDICTING PROTEST WITH OIL PRICES CONDITIONAL
TO TAXES/GDP IN RENTIER HYBRID REGIME STATES AND RENTIER
DEMOCRACIES, 1995-2014
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Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Hybrid Regimes

Democracies

.001

.0005

(.001)

(.001)

.001

-.022

(.01)

(.01)

-.297

.120*

(.26)

(.05)

-1.355

.684**

(1.14)

(.21)

.0002

.0002*

(.0001)

(.0001)

N

161

76

Pseudo R2

0.6124

0.7058

Oil prices t-1 X Taxes/GDP

Oil prices t-1

Taxes/GDP

Stabilization Fund

GDP per capita

Note: Population was used as an exposure variable in all models. Country fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by country. Statistical significance: **p< .01, *p< .05.
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APPENDIX J: ECONOMIC DISTRICTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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Economic districts of the Russian Federation
Central
Central Black Earth
East Siberian
Far Eastern
North Caucasus
Northern
Northwestern
Ural
Volga
Volga
Volga-Vyatka
West Siberian
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APPENDIX K: ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST,
2007-2015. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ANALYSIS USING THE SECOND
ESTIMATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

139

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita

-.001
(.001)

Unemployment

.04**
(.01)

.04**
(.01)

Mining employment

-.07
(.03)

Tax increase

.14
(.43)

.14
(.45)

CPI

-.04
(.03)

-.05*
(.02)

State sector employment

-5.99
(19.83)

-1.04
(18.20)

Ethnic population

-.01
(.01)

-.01
(.01)

Higher education

.09**
(.02)

.07**
(.01)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=640.
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APPENDIX L: ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTEST,
2007-2015. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL ANALYSIS USING TIME LAGS AND
THE SECOND ESTIMATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE

141

Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita t-1

-.001
(.001)

Unemployment t-1

.03**
(.01)

.03**
(.01)

Mining employment t-1

-.09*
(.04)

Tax increase t-1

-.15
(.30)

-.20
(.30)

CPI t-1

-.03
(.04)

-.04
(.04)

-3.64
(20.79)

4.31
(18.87)

Ethnic population

-.01
(.01)

-.01
(.01)

Higher education

.10**
(.02)

.08**
(.01)

State sector employment t-1

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=639.
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APPENDIX M: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTIGOVERNMENT PROTEST, 2007-2015
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Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita

.0003
(.001)

Unemployment

.06*
(.03)

.06*
(.03)

Mining employment

.06
(.05)

Tax increases t-1

-.13
(.37)

-.14
(.36)

CPI

-.10
(.09)

-.10
(.09)

-151.95**
(41.38)

-158.50**
(39.45)

Ethnic population

-.03**
(.01)

-.03**
(.01)

Higher education

.10
(.07)

.10
(.07)

Population

.0002
(.0003)

.0002
(.0003)

State sector employment

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=640.
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APPENDIX N: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTIGOVERNMENT PROTEST, 2007-2015 USING TIME LAGS
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Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita t-1

-.0002
(.001)

Unemployment t-1

.04*
(.02)

.04*
(.02)

Mining employment t-1

.02
(.04)

Tax increases

-.26
(.38)

-.26
(.38)

CPI t-1

-.04
(.04)

-.04
(.04)

State sector employment t-1

-172.05**
(41.67)

-174.04**
(39.97)

Ethnic population

-.03**
(.01)

-.03**
(.01)

Higher education

.12
(.08)

.12
(.07)

Population

.0002
(.0003)

.0002
(.0003)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=639.
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APPENDIX O: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTIGOVERNMENT PROTEST, 2007-2015 USING THE SECOND MEASURE
OF UNEMPLOYMENT
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Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita

.0003
(.001)

Unemployment

.05*
(.02)

.05*
(.02)

Mining employment

.07
(.05)

Tax increase

-.14
(.36)

-.15
(.35)

CPI

-.09
(.10)

-.08
(.10)

-154.31**
(41.02)

-161.32**
(38.13)

Ethnic population

-.03**
(.01)

-.04**
(.01)

Higher education

.10
(.07)

.10
(.07)

Population

.0002
(.0003)

.0002
(.0003)

State sector employment

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=640.
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APPENDIX P: LOGIT ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SHOCKS AND ANTIGOVERNMENT PROTEST, 2007-2015 USING TIME LAGS AND THE
SECOND MEASURE OF UNEMPLOYMENT
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Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Clustered by federal district
GRP per capita t-1

-.0003
(.001)

Unemployment t-1

.05**
(.02)

.05**
(.02)

Mining employment t-1

-.03
(.05)

Tax increase t-1

-.26
(.38)

-.26
(.38)

CPI t-1

-.02
(.06)

-.02
(.06)

State sector employment t-1

-175.97**
(41.16)

-178.51**
(38.90)

Ethnic population

-.04**
(.01)

-.04**
(.01)

Higher education

.13
(.07)

.13
(.07)

Population

.0002
(.0003)

.0002
(.0003)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Population used as an exposure variable.
**p< .01; *p< .05; Obs=639.
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